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WHAT THE ABORTION DISCLOSURE CASES SAY ABOUT 
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PERSUASIVE GOVERNMENT 
SPEECH ON PRODUCT LABELS 
L ESLIE GIELOW JACOBS t 
INTRODUCTION 
In Malaysia , it's a diseased lung. 1 In Thailand, it's skulls floating 
behind the smoker.2 In Brazil, it's a dead fetus lying among cigarette 
butts.3 "In New Zealand, it 's a gangrenous foot." 4 In the United States, 
it's going to be the same type of color graphics, along with pointed warn-
ings, covering the top half of the cigarette package .5 And tobacco labels 
are ju st the tip of the iceberg. Alcohol vendors already must include 
warnings on their labels,6 the new national health reform legislation re-
quires that fast food chains post calorie counts on signs and menus,7 and 
proposals continue to surface to mandate "cigarette-style" warnings on a 
range of other products because they pose a public health danger. Prod-
ucts targeted for warning labels, both here and abroad, include sugary 
sodas, violent video games, cell phones, sun beds, butter, cheese, foods 
children consume which contain artificial coloring that may increase 
hyperactivity, and vacation travel because it results in global warming. 8 
t Profe sso r and Director, Capital Center for Public Law & Policy , University of the Pacific , 
McGeorg e School of Law. Thanks to Abner Greene and Helen Norton for their helpful comments on 
a draft of a related article. Thank s to Mike Claiborne and Rebecca Whitfield for their excellent 
resea rch assistance. 
I. Ranit Mishori, Packing a Heavier Warning; Elsewhere, Cigarette Boxes Bear Graphic 
Evidence of Smoking's Ill Effects; U.S. labels Will Soon Do the Same, WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 2009, at 
HE!. 
2. Miranda Hitti, Cigarette Warnings: Is Bigger Better?, CBS NEWS.COM, Feb. 6, 2007 , 
http ://www .cbs new s.com/s torie s/2007/02/06/health/webmd/m ain2439660. shtml . 
3. Mishori, supra note I , at HEI . 
4 . Id. 
5. The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act requires that the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services issue guidelines no later than June 2011 requiring color graphics depict-
ing the hea lth effects of smok ing to accompany label warnings. See Act of June 22, 2009, Pub . L. 
No. 111-3 1, § 201(d), 123 Stat.1776 , 1845 (2009)(tobecodifiedat 15 U.S.C. § 1333(d)). 
6. See MICHAELS. WOGALTER, HANDBOOK OF W ARN!NGS 669- 85 (2006). 
7. Stephanie Rosenbloom, Calorie Data to be Posted at Most Chains, N.Y. TIMES, March 
24, 20 I 0 , at BI, available at http ://www.nyt ime s.com/20 10/03/24/busine ss/24me nu.html. 
8. See Press Release, U.S. Congressman Joe Baca , Rep. Baca Introduce s Legislation to 
Make Violent Video Games Sold With Health Warning Label (Jan. 7, 2009) ("Warning: Excessive 
exposure to violent video game s and other violent media has been linked to aggressive behavior."), 
available at http://www.house. gov/ap ps/list/press/ca43_baca/videogame_heal th_010709.html ; Pres s 
Release, Ctr. for Sci. in the Pub . Intere st, CSP! Calls on FDA to Require Health Warning s on Sodas 
(Ju ly 13, 2005), available at http://www.cspinet.org/new/200507131.html ("To help protect your 
wai stline and your teeth , consider drinking diet sodas or water."); Daily Mail Online, Dairy Products 
to Carry Cigarette-Style Health Warnings as Government Uses 'Shock Tactics', MAIL ONLINE, 
March 3, 2008, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/health/article -524931/Dairy-products-carry-cigarette -
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Of course, producers protest the labeling requirements and, fre-
quently, succeed in defeating proposed regulation. 9 But sometimes they 
don't; and then, increasingly, they go to court, arguing that the Constitu-
tion protects the integrity of their commercial message from government 
imposed speech. 10 Specifically, cigarette sellers contend that, even if the 
purpose is public protection, Congress cannot force them "to disseminate 
a Government-drafted anti-tobacco message" or to "stigmatize their own 
product on their own packaging." 11 The district court hearing the ciga-
rette sellers' case has rejected this part of their challenge, 12 but the parties 
will likely appeal. And other challenges to new labeling requirements 
will surely follow. 
One may have thought this battle was over, given the ubiquity of 
product disclosure requirements and the fact that more cautious and less 
eye-catching cigarette package warnings have been in place for over 40 
years. 13 Furthermore, even though the Court has elevated product adver-
tising to a category of constitutionally protected speech, early on it sig-
naled that its skepticism would be directed primarily toward regulations 
that restricted the free flow of commercial speech 14 and that it would 
accord more deferential review to requirements that vendors disclose 
additional information along with their own speech. 15 
style-health-wamings-Govemment-uses-shock-tactics.html (England's Food Standards Agency 
considered and rejected a proposal to put warnings on cheese and butter); Kate Devlin , Sunbeds 
'Sfwuld Carry Cigarette-Style Health Warnings', TELEGRAPH, June 20, 2009, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/health/healthnews/5579038/Sunbeds-should-carry-cigarette-style-health-
wamings.html; Liane Katz, Call For Cigarette-Style Warnings for Flights, GUARDlAN.CO.UK, April 
5, 2007, http://www.guardian .co. uk/travel/2007 /apr/05/travelnews.green.cheapflights; SnackCheck , 
The Twenty Worst Snacks , http://www.snackcheck.co.uk/2566/bottom-20 -snacks/ (last visited June 
3, 2010) ("In July 2010 , the [European Union] will make it mandatory to put cigarette-style labels on 
products that include these colourings [that the Hyperactive Children ' s Support Group recommends 
against]."); Posting of Michelle Quinn to The Bay Area, S.F. May Require Warnings About Cell-
phone Radiation, http://bayarea.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/l 2/23/sf-may -require-wamings-about-
cellphone-radiation (Dec. 23, 2009, 5:40 PM). 
9. See, e.g., Press Release , Wash . Legal Found., WLF Opposes Efforts By Food Police 
Targeting Soft Drink Beverages, Dec. 16, 2005 (explaining comments filed with Food and Drug 
Administration opposing proposed labeling requirement) . 
10. See infra Part I.C (discussing recent lower court disclosure requirement decisions). 
11. Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief '!I'll 39, 51, Commonwealth 
Brands, Inc. v. United States , 678 F. Supp. 2d 512 (W.D. Ky. 2010) (No. I :09-CV-117-M) (plain-
tiffs include: Corrunonwealth Brands, Inc.; Conwood Co., LLC; Discount Tobacco City & Lottery , 
Inc.; Lorillard Tobacco Co.; National Tobacco Co. ; and R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.). 
12. Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 2d 512, 529- 30 (W.D. Ky. 
2010). 
13. The 1964 Surgeon General ' s Report on Smoking and Health led to enactment of the 
FCLAA in 1965, which required that health warnings be included on cigarette packages . Lindsey v. 
Tacoma -Pierce County Health Dep't , 195 F.3d 1065, 1069 (9th Cir. 1999). The statute and its 
amendments represented a compromise between health proponents and tobacco interests . NAT'L 
CANCER INST., MONOGRAPH 19: THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA IN PROMOTING AND REDUCING TOBACCO 
USE 301-03 (2008) . 
14. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council , Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 755 
( 1976). 
15. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 47 J U.S. 
626, 651 (1985). 
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But things are changing across the free speech landscape. Recently, 
the Supreme Court has rendered decisions that interpret the free speech 
· I · 116 d 11 guarantee more expansive y to protect commercia an corporate 
speakers from government regulations that restrict their speech. The re-
curring and unresolved question is whether and how these changes in the 
jurisprudence of speech restrictions will modify the authority of govern-
ments to achieve their legitimate regulatory objectives by means of in-
formation disclosure requirements imposed on commercial speech. All of 
the current Supreme Court justices agree that governments have the con-
stitutional authority to require commercial speakers to publish some re-
levant facts when the government purpose is to supplement advertising 
that would otherwise be false, misleading, or have the potential to mis-
lead consumers. 18 But countering the potential for consumer deception 
has never been the only purpose that disclosure requirements have 
served.19 Increasingly, government regulators require disclosure along 
with commercial speech to counter the potential for consumer persuasion 
as well. That is, governments select information and require its disclo-
sure not only to aid the rational, self-interested decision making of indi-
vidual consumers, but also to influence the consumer's decision making 
in a way that serves a broader public interest.2° Consequently, that broad-
er public interest may well be reducing demand for the lawful product on 
which the information disclosure must appear. In the context of speech 
restraints, the Court has repeatedly emphasized that governments may 
not constitutionally engage in the "paternalism" of restricting truthful 
commercial speech that individual consumers may hear, when the pur-
pose of that restriction is to reduce demand for a lawful product.21 Left 
uncertain is whether the Court's constitutional interpretations that limit 
16. See infra Part I (discussion of commercial speech). 
17. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010) (pre-election 
corporate spending is constitutionally protected from federal regulation). 
18. Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz , P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1341 (2010) (up-
holding federal statutory requirement that law firms offering bankruptcy services "include certain 
information about its bankruptcy-assistance and related services" because the requirement was 
"'reasonably related to the [Government's] interest in preventing deception of consumers"' (quoting 
2.auderer, 471 U.S. at 651)); Id. 1343 n.l (Thomas , J. , concurring) (acknowledging the Court 's 
"longstanding assumption that a consumer-fraud regulation that compels the disclosure of certain 
factual information in advertisements may intrude less significantly on First Amendment interests 
than an outright prohibition on all advertisements that have the potential to mislead"). 
19. See Robert Post, Transparent and Efficient Markets : Compelled Commercial Speech and 
Coerced Commercial Association in United Foods, Zauderer, and Abood, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 555, 
584 (2006) ("[C]ommercial speech is routinely and pervasively compelled for reasons that have little 
to do with the prevention of deception ."); see also Kathleen M. Sullivan, Cheap Spirits, Cigarettes, 
and Free Speech: The Implications of 44 Liquormart , 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 123, 125-2 7 (1996). 
20. The new cigarette package labeling mandate makes obvious the persuasive objectives that 
underpin , at least in part, many disclosure requirements imposed to advance public purposes in the 
modem marketplace. lt is indeed difficult to deny that the new labeling mandate is "plainly intended 
to deliver a visually striking, attention-grabbing anti-smoking message." Complaint for Declaratory 
Judgment and Injunctive Relief'l! 53, Commonwealth Brands , lnc. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 2d 
512 (W.D. Ky. 2010) (No. 1 :09-CV-117-M). 
21. For a discussion of the anti-paternalism trend in the Court's commercial speech jurispru -
dence, see infra Part I.C.2. 
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regulators' abilities to restrict commercial speech because consumers 
may find it persuasive also apply to contract government discretion to 
impose commercial speech disclosure requirements for the same public 
purpose of reducing demand and because of the same presumption about 
the potentially persuasive effect of unsupplemented speech. 
Yet this apparent uncertainty in the commercial speech jurispru-
dence has an odd and inconsistent counterpart. At the same time that 
members of the Court have suggested disclosure requirements imposed 
on commercial speech for purposes other than preventing consumer de-
ception may be constitutionally suspect, in the entirely analogous context 
of the abortion service transaction, the Court has applied deferential ra-
tional basis review to uphold selective and persuasive disclosure re-
quirements that were imposed for purposes other than correcting poten-
tially misleading speech.22 Although the Court's plurality analysis with 
respect to the Free Speech Clause analysis' application to "informed con-
sent" to abortion requirements was terse, the lower courts have parsed, 
expanded, and relied upon it.23 In light of the Court's changing jurispru-
dence, it is not clear what level of scrutiny should apply to the emerging 
genre of informational and persuasive disclosure requirements that the 
new cigarette labels exemplify. What is clear is that there is no difference 
between the speakers' Free Speech Clause rights in the two lines of cases 
that should lead to a different judicial analysis of government disclosure 
requirements imposed on them. So long as the informed consent to abor-
tion jurisprudence remains unchanged, it is controlling in the context of 
commercial speech disclosures. 24 Deferential rational basis scrutiny ap-
plies to judicial evaluations of information disclosure mandates imposed 
on product labels and other types of commercial speech, even if the gov-
ernment's purpose is something other than preventing consumer decep-
tion and even if the information is obviously selected and presented to 
persuade. 
Part I situates disclosure requirements within the framework the 
Court has developed to evaluate government regulations of commercial 
speech. Part II describes the different Jaw that courts have developed to 
evaluate disclosure requirements imposed on the abortion procedure. Part 
III points out that what courts tend to treat as different lines of cases-
compelled commercial speech and abortion disclosure-in fact involve 
the same type of government action imposed on the same category of 
22. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey , 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992) ("To be sure, the phy-
sician's First Amendment rights not to speak are implicated , but only as part of the practice of medi-
cine, subject to reasonable licensing and regulation by the State. We see no constitutional infirmity 
in the requirement that the physician provide the information mandated by the State here.") (citations 
omitted). 
23. See infra Part Il.B. 
24. See infra Part III. 
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speech, and so the Free Speech Clause analysis applied to each must be 
the same. 
I. THE LAW OF GOVERNMENT MANDA TED COMMERCIAL SPEECH 
DISCLOSURES 
Government entities at all levels mandate that certain information 
appear on product labels. These include Congress,25 a number of federal 
government agencies, 26 state Jegislatures,27 state agencies,28 and city 
councils and agencies. 29 California voters imposed a labeling require-
ment by voter initiative.30 Product sellers have always used the political 
process to fight labeling requirements, and have often succeeded.31 Only 
fairly recently have they begun to use the Free Speech Clause as a direct 
means of challenging information disclosure requirements.32 These chal-
lenges rely both on the Jack of clarity in the disclosure requirement juris-
prudence and the trend evident in the speech restraint cases to interpret 
the rights of corporate and commercial speakers more expansively to 
limit the scope of permissible government regulatory actions. 
A. The Disclosure Distinction in the Supreme Court's Commercial 
Speech Jurisprudence 
Free Speech Clause protection for commercial speech began in the 
mid 1970's. Reversing previous interpretations, in Virginia State Board 
of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, lnc .,33 the Court 
25. See, e.g., Nutrition Labeljng and Education Act of 1990 (NLEA) , 21 U.S.C. § 343 (2006). 
26. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. §§ 101.l -101.95 (2010) (Food and Drug Admirustration regulations 
imposing Food for Human Consumption Labeling Standards); 27 C.F.R. §§ 4.1-4.5 (2010) (De-
partment of the Treasury , Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau , imposing labeling require-
ments for wine); 16 C.F.R . §§ 1201.1- 1420.1 (2010) (Consumer Product Safety Commission prod-
uct labeJjng standards). 
27. See, e.g., CTR. FOR SCI. IN THE PUB. INTEREST & NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL, 
SHREDDING THE FOOD SAFETY NET (2006), available at http://www.cspinet.org/new/pdf/shredding 
.pdf (reviewing state food safety and labeling laws that propo sed action in Congress would preempt) . 
28. See, e.g., CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE§§ 32912- 32921 (West 1994) (milk product label-
ing) ; CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 19080--19093 (West 1964) (home furnishings labeling). 
29. See, e.g., 8 S.F. CAL. HEALTH CODE§ 468 .3 (2010) (menu labeling at chain restaurants) . 
30. Proposition 65, which became law as the Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement 
Act of 1986, requires businesses to "notify Californians about significant amounts of chemicals in 
the product s they purcha se, in their homes or workplaces, or that are released into the environment. " 
OEHHA Proposition 65: Proposition 65 in Plain Language!, http://oehha .ca.gov/Prop65/background/ 
p65plain .html (last visited June 4, 2010). 
31. See, e.g., Leonard H. Glantz & Georg e J. Annas , The FDA, Preemption, and the Supreme 
Court, 358 NEW ENG. J. of MED. 1883, 1884-85 (2008) (describing efforts by cigarette makers and 
drug manufacturers to obtain immunity from state law requirements , including disclosure require-
ments, through federal law preemption); Dan Shapley, Pennsylvania Allows Hormone-Free Milk 
Labeling: Monsanto is lobbying States to Restrict Labeling, THE DAILY GREEN, Jan. 17, 2008, 
available at http://www .thedailygreen.com/healthy-eating/eat-safe/hormone -free-milk-47011701 
#ixzz0f5Mm9Csu. 
32. See, e.g., N.Y . State Rest. Ass'n v. N.Y. City Bd. Of Health , 556 F.3d 114, 117- 18 (2d 
Cir. 2009) (fast food calorie count labels); Nat ' ! Elec. Mfr. Ass'n v. Sorrell , 272 F.3d 104, 106 (2d 
Cir. 2001) (labeling of products containing mercury); Int'! Dairy Foods Ass 'n v. Amestoy , 92 F.3d 
67, 69 (2d Cir. 1996) (milk hormon e labels). 
33. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
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held that speech "propos[ing] a commercial transaction" is not "wholly 
outside the protection of the First Amendment." 34 The Court explained 
that the constitutional protection commercial speech receives is grounded 
in the "public interest that [economic] decisions, in the aggregate, be 
intelligent and well-informed," and in the "particular consumer's interest 
in the free flow of commercial information." 35 In other cases the Court 
has described "[t]he commercial marketplace" as "a forum where ideas 
and information flourish," to which "the general rule" applies, "that the 
speaker and the audience, not the government, assess the value of the 
information presented." 36 Still, a majority of the Court continues to ac-
knowledge "the 'distinction between speech proposing a commercial 
transaction, which occurs in an area traditionally subject to government 
regulation, and other varieties of speech. ,,,37 
In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Service Commis-
sion of New York,38 the Court established a four-part test39 which both 
protects commercial speech because of its "constitutional value" and 
recognizes that commercial speech's distinguishing attributes make cer-
tain types of content based government regulation more constitutionally 
permissible. 40 The Court has described the Central Hudson test as impos-
ing "intermediate scrutiny," a standard between the rigorous strict scru-
tiny that applies to other speech regulations and the rational basis stan-
dard that the Court uses to review regulations that do not implicate the 
free speech right.41 Although a number of justices have criticized the test 
as insufficiently protective of commercial speech, at least in particular 
contexts, the Court's majority continues to apply it to evaluate regula-
tions that restrict or suppress commercial speech. 42 
34. Id. at 760--62 (overruling Valentin e v. Chrestens en, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942)). 
35. Id. at 763, 765. 
36. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 367 (2002) (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 
507 U.S. 761, 767 (1993)). 
37. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 554 (2001) (quoting Cent. Hudson Gas & 
Elec. Corp . v. Pub. Serv. Comm ' n ofN.Y. , 447 U.S. 557, 562 (1980)). 
38. 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
39. Id. at 564 (stating that if the speech is "neither misleading nor related to unlawful activ-
ity," the state "must assert a substantial interest ," the restriction must "directly advance" that interest, 
and the restriction must not be "excessive ," meaning it cannot survive if more limited means could 
accomplish the purpose) . 
40. Id. at 561. Specifically, the characteristics that distinguish commercial speech are its 
"greater objectivity ," which "justifies affording the State more freedom to distinguish false commer-
cial advertisements from true ones ," and its "greater hardiness ," which "inspired as it is by the profit 
motive, likely diminishe s the chilling effect that may attend its regulation ." 44 Liquormart , Inc. v. 
Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 499 (1996) (plurality opinion). 
41. Milavetz , Gallop & Milavet z, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1339 (2010); Loril -
lard, 533 U.S. at 554 (describing Central Huds on test as '" substantially similar' to the test for time, 
place , and manner restrictions "). 
42. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr ., 535 U.S. 357, 367- 68 (2002) (noting that "several 
Members of the Court have expressed doubts about the Central Hudson analysis and whether it 
should apply in particular cases ," but nevertheless finding it to provide '" an adequate basis for 
decision '" of the case) (quoting Lorillard , 533 U.S. at 554-555)) . 
2010] GOVERNMENT SPEECH ON PRODUCT LABELS 861 
Soon after its decision in Central Hudson, however, the Court relied 
upon the differences between commercial and other constitutionally pro-
tected speech to hold that a lower level of judicial scrutiny should apply 
to at least certain types of government regulations requiring commercial 
speakers to disclose additional information about their products or ser-
vices than to those that directly restrict or suppress commercial speech. 43 
In Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of 
Ohio,44 an attorney challenged the constitutionality of a state disciplinary 
rule requiring any attorney advertisement that mentioned contingent fee 
rates to "disclos[e] whether percentages are computed before or after 
deduction of court costs and expenses." 45 His advertisement had stated 
that clients would pay no fees if they lost, but it did not disclose that they 
would still be liable for the lawsuit's costs .46 The Ohio Office of Disci-
plinary Counsel filed a complaint, alleging that, absent the required dis-
closure, the attorney's advertising was "deceptive" in violation of the 
disciplinary rule.47 The Court upheld application of the disciplinary rule 
to sanction the attorney for failing to include the required disclosure .48 
The Court explicitly rejected the attorney's argument that "precisely 
the same inquiry as determining the validity of [] restrictions on advertis-
ing content" should apply to determine the constitutionality of the disclo-
sure requirement. 49 The Court stated that the "[a]ppellant ... overlooks 
material differences between disclosure requirements and outright prohi-
bitions on speech." 50 The Court distinguished instances in which gov-
ernment mandated noncommercial speakers recite or publicize ideologi-
cal speech-mandates which the Court has consistently invalidated51 -
from the situation before it, in which the government required commer-
cial speakers to supplement their own commercial speech with additional 
facts: 
But the interests at stake in this case are not of the same order as 
those discussed in Wooley, Tomillo, and Barnette . Ohio has not at-
tempted to "prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, 
religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by 
word or act their faith therein." The State has attempted only to pre-
scribe what shall be orthodox in commercial advertising, and its pre-
43. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 
626, 65 I (1985). 
44. 471 U.S. 626 (1985). 
45. Id. at 633 (alteration in original). 
46. Id. at 652. 
47. Id. at 631. 
48. Id . at 655. 
49. Id. at 650. 
SO. Id . 
51. See id. (citing Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (invalidating government re-
quirement that plaintiff display "Live Free or Die" license plate); Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Torn-
illo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (invalidating right of reply requirement for newspaper); W. Va. State Bd. 
of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (invalidating mandatory pledge recitation and flag sa-
lute)). 
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scription has taken the form of a requirement that appellant include in 
his advertising purely factual and uncontroversial information about 
the terms under which his services will be available. Because the ex-
tension of First Amendment protection to commercial speech is justi-
fied principally by the value to consumers of the information such 
speech provides, appellant's constitutionally protected interest in not 
providing any particular factual information in his advertising is mi-
nimal. Thus, in virtually all our commercial speech decisions to date, 
we have emphasized that because disclosure requirements trench 
much more narrowly on an advertiser's interests than do flat prohibi-
tions on speech, "waming[s] or disclaimer[s] might be appropriately 
required . .. in order to dissipate the possibility of consumer confu-
. d · ,,52 s10n or ecept10n. 
However, the Court added: 
We do not suggest that disclosure requirements do not implicate 
the advertiser's First Amendment rights at all. We recognize that un-
justified or unduly burdensome disclosure requirements might offend 
the First Amendment by chilling protected commercial speech. But 
we hold that an advertiser's rights are adequately protected as long as 
disclosure requirements are reasonably related to the State's interest 
in preventing deception of consumers . 53 
The Court found the disciplinary rule disclosure requirement in the case 
met the rational basis test, which meant that it accepted as reasonable the 
state's assertion that the potential harm of deception existed, that the 
disclaimer would help to correct it,54 and that it did not require the means 
be closely tailored to achieve this end.55 The Court also rejected the at-
52. Zauderer , 471 U.S. at 651 (alterations in original). 
53. Id. 
54. Id. at 652- 53 ("The assumption that substantial numbers of potential clients would be so 
misled is hardly a speculative one: it is a commonplace that members of the public are often unaware 
of the technical meanings of such terms as 'fees ' and 'costs' - terms that, in ordinary usage, might 
well be virtually interchangeable . When the possibility of deception is as self-evident as it is in this 
case, we need not require the State to 'conduct a survey of the ... public before it [may] determine 
that the [advertisement] had a tendency to mislead.' The State's position that it is deceptive lo em-
ploy advertising that refers to contingent-fee arrangements without mentioning the client's liability 
for costs is reasonable enough to support a requirement that information regarding the client's liabil-
ity for costs be disclosed. " (quoting FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 391- 92 (1965) 
(alterations in original)). 
55. Id. at 651 n.14 ("Although we have subjected outright prohibitions on speech lo [least 
restrictive means] analysis , all our discussions of restraints on commercial speech have recom-
mended disclosure requirements as one of the acceptable less restrictive alternatives to actual sup-
pression of speech. Because the First Amendment interests implicated by disclosure requirements 
are substantially weaker than those at stake when speech is actually suppressed, we do not think it 
appropriate to strike down such requirements merely because other possible means by which the 
State might achieve its purposes can be hypothesized. Similarly, we are unpersuaded by appellant's 
argument that a disclosure requirement is subject to attack if it is 'under-inclusive' - that is, if it does 
not get at all facets of the problem it is designed to ameliorate . As a general matter, governments are 
entitled to attack problems piecemeal , save where their policies implicate rights so fundamental that 
strict scrutiny must be applied . The right of a commercial speaker not to divulge accurate informa-
tion regarding his services is not such a fundamental right." (citations omitted)). 
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torney's claim that its application "would in fact be unduly burdensome 
and would tend to chill advertising of contingent-fee arrangements." 56 
The Court in 'Zauderer thus planted the seeds for either a broad or 
narrow interpretation of its holding. On the one hand, the Court broadly 
distinguished between "disclosure requirements" and "outright prohibi-
tions on speech," noting that the former is an "acceptable less restrictive 
alternative to actual suppression of speech." 57 It affirmed that the primary 
reason commercial speech receives protection is "the value to consumers 
of the information," and that, although vendors may prefer not to dis-
close certain information about their products or services, the extent of 
their "constitutionally protected interest in not providing any particular 
factual information in ... advertising is rninimal."58 It also confirmed 
that governments may be selective rather than comprehensive in mandat-
ing factual disclosures, addressing one problem at a time. 59 
On the other hand, and despite the broad language and reasoning 
that seem to distinguish between speech restraints and required factual 
disclosures, the Court discussed disclosure requirements in the context of 
one imposed for the purpose of correcting commercial speech that would 
otherwise be deceptive, and included that government purpose in the 
articulation of its rational basis test. 60 The Court also noted that, although 
listeners' interests are the primary reason the Constitution protects com-
mercial speech, advertisers in fact possess "First Amendment rights," 
and that, ac some point, even disclosure requirements may be "unjusti-
fied" or "unduly burdensome" and "might offend the First Amendment 
by chilling protected commercial speech." 61 
In the 25 years since 'Zauderer, the Court's decisions and the state-
ments of various justices have muddied, rather than clarified, the deci-
sion's meaning with respect to the appropriate standard of review for 
disclosure requirements imposed on commercial speech. In Meese v. 
Keene, 62 decided one year after 'Zauderer, the Court rejected a challenge 
56. Id. at 652 n.15 ("Evaluation of this claim is somewhat difficult in light of the Ohio court's 
failure to specify precisely what disclosures were required. The gist of the report of the Board of 
Commissioners on this point, however, was that appellant's advertising was potentially deceptive 
because it 'left standing the impression that if there were no recovery, the client would owe nothing. ' 
Accordingly, the report at a minimum suggests that an attorney advertising a contingent fee must 
disclose that a client may be liable for costs even if the lawsuit is unsuccessful. The report and the 
opinion of the Ohio Supreme Court also suggest that the attorney's contingent-fee rate must be 
disclosed. Neither requirement seems intrinsically burdensome; and they certainly cannot be said to 
be unreasonable as applied to appellant, who included in his advertisement no information whatso-
ever regarding costs and fee rates. This case does not provide any factual basis for finding that 
Ohio's disclosure requirements are unduly burdensome." (citations omitted)). 
57. ld.at650-5J&n.14. 
58. Id. at 651 (first emphasis added). 
59. See id. at 651 n.14. 
60. Id. at 651 ("[A]n advertiser's rights are adequately protected as long as disclosure re-
quirements are reasonably related to the State's interest in preventing deception of consumers.") . 
61. Id. 
62. 481 U.S. 465 (1987). 
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by a California legislator to a federal statutory designation of films pro-
duced by the Canadian government as "political propaganda" and the 
requirement that he disclose details about his connections to the "foreign 
government" producer and details of its required registration with the 
Department of Justice pursuant to the statute.63 Although the case in-
volved a disclosure requirement imposed on core political speech, the 
Court upheld the statutory requirements in strong language that distin-
guished disclosure requirements from prohibitions of speech: 
Congress did not prohibit, edit, or restrain the distribution of advo-
cacy materials in an ostensible effort to protect the public from con-
version, confusion, or deceit. To the contrary, Congress simply re-
quired the disseminators of such material to make additional disclo-
sures that would better enable the public to evaluate the import of the 
propaganda . . .. Disseminators of propaganda may go beyond the 
disclosures required by statute and add any further information they 
think germane to the public's viewing of the materials. By compel-
ling some disclosure of information and permitting more, the Act's 
approach recognizes that the best remedy for misleading or inaccu-
rate speech contained within materials subject to the Act is fair, truth-
ful, and accurate speech.64 
In contrast to its deferential treatment of Congress's "propaganda" 
label, the Court in Ibanez v. Florida Department of Business and Profes-
sional Regulation, Board of Accountancy6 5 more rigorously reviewed a 
state bar's reprimand of an attorney for, among other things, failing to 
include a disclaimer in her advertising that explained the meaning of her 
specialty designation.66 The Court's analysis of the disclaimer require-
ment confusingly mixed references to considerations that it used in Zau-
derer to analyze the constitutionality of disclosure requirements imposed 
on commercial speech with references to considerations that it employs 
to determine whether commercial speech restraints comport with the free 
speech guarantee. 67 
63. Id. at 467, 469. The legislator was not required to place the tenn "political propaganda" on 
the film as he showed it to a public audience . The Court nevertheless held that he had demonstrated 
injury sufficient to establish standing to challenge the tenn in the statute based upon evidence that 
demonstrated that "his exhibition of films that have been classified as 'political propaganda' by the 
Department of Justice would substantially harm his chances for reelection and would adversely 
affect his reputation in the community. " Id. at 474. 
64. Id. at 481 ("The prospective viewers of the three films at issue may harbor an unreasoning 
prejudice against arguments that have been identified as the 'political propaganda ' of foreign princi-
pals and their agents, but the Act allows appellee to combat any such bias simply by explaining-
before, during, or after the film, or in a wholly separate context-that Canada's interest in the conse-
quences of nuclear war and acid rain does not necessarily undennine the integrity or the persuasive-
ness of its advocacy."). 
65. 512U.S.136(1994 ). 
66. See id. at 139-40 . 
67. Most of the case involved review of the reprimand based upon the content of the attor-
ney's advertising , without reference to the possible alternative of including a disclaimer to explain 
the significance of the specialty designation . The Court characterized the sanctions in this respect as 
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In other cases not directly addressing disclosure requirements, com-
binations of justices have distinguished ?.auderer in ways that suggest a 
narrow interpretation. In Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, lnc., 68 a 
closely divided Court rejected the claim of fruit growers that the manda-
tory assessments to fund generic advertising violated their free speech 
rights. 69 The four dissenting justices would have accepted it, and in the 
course of their discussion rejected ?.auderer as precedent for low level 
scrutiny of the subsidization mandate: 
In speaking of the objecting lawyer's comparatively modest interest 
in challenging the state requirement, we referred to protection of 
commercial speech as '~ustified principally by the value to consum-
ers of the information such speech provides .... " We said "princi-
pally," not exclusively, and proceeded to uphold the state require-
ment not because a regulation adding to public information is im-
mune from scrutiny, but because the mandate at issue bore a reason-
able relation to the "State's interest in preventing deception of con-
sumers," who might otherwise be ignorant of the real terms on which 
the advertiser intended to do business. 'Zauderer thereby reaffrrmed a 
longstanding preference for disclosure requirements over outright 
bans, as more narrowly tailored cures for the potential of commercial 
messages to mislead by saying too little. But however long the pedi-
gree of such mandates may be, and however broad the government's 
authority to impose them, 'Zauderer carries no authority for a man-
date unrelated to the interest in avoiding misleading or incomplete 
. l 10 commercia messages. 
"restraints" on commercial speech and analyzed them under its mid-level test for commercial speech 
restrictions, finding that the state had not established a substantial purpose for imposing the restric-
tion because it had not offered evidence that the specialty designation was actually or inherently 
misleading. Id. at 139-43. At the end of its opinion, however, the Court addressed the state's alterna-
tive claim that, even if it could not prohibit the attorney's speech entirely, it was entitled to repri-
mand her for failing to publish a disclaimer because her use of the specialty designation was "poten-
tially misleading." Id. at 146. The Court did not directly acknowledge that the state's use of the 
alternate means of a disclosure requirement might subject its action to a more lenient, rational basis 
review under ZLluderer. Instead, it said that "[i]f the 'protections afforded commercial speech are to 
retain their force,"' then "we cannot allow rote invocation of the words 'potentially misleading' to 
supplant the Board's burden to 'demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that its restriction 
will in fact alleviate them to a material degree,"' which are requirements drawn from the Central 
Hudson test that applies to speech restraints. Id. at 146 (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary 
Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 648-49 (1985) (addressing speech restraints), 
and Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 771 (1993)). Next, however, the Court applied a portion of its 
disclosure requirement reasoning in 'Zauderer, finding that the disclaimer at issue was "copiously 
detailed," and invalidating it as unduly burdensome. Ibane z, 512 U.S. at 146-47 & n.11. Throughout 
its decision , the Court emphasized the state of the record, indicating that, with respect to the dis-
claimer, its analysis might well have been different had the State been able to "point to any harm that 
is potentially real, not purely hypothetical." Id. at 146. The Court noted, as well, that it was unsure 
whether use of the disclaimer would have "saved [the attorney] from censure," suggesting that it 
viewed the reprimand , in the context of the case, as equivalent to a speech restraint. Id. at 147 n. I 1. 
68. 521 U.S. 457 (1997). 
69. Id. at 460-61. 
70. Id. at 490-91 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (alteration in original). 
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In United States v. United Foods, Inc.,11 the Glickman dissenters 
joined several justices in the majority to invalidate a federal statutory 
requirement that mushroom producers pay an assessment for generic 
advertising that was not government speech.72 Echoing the Glickman 
dissenters, the United Foods Court adopted the view that product pro-
ducers have First Amendment rights that may be infringed by regulatory 
actions compelling them to subsidize commercial speech with which 
they disagree. In its short opinion, the Court also distinguished Zauderer: 
Noting that substantial numbers of potential clients might be misled 
by omission of the explanation, the [Zauderer] Court sustained the 
requirement as consistent with the State's interest in "preventing de-
ception of consumers." There is no suggestion in the case now before 
us that the mandatory assessments imposed to require one group of 
private persons to pay for speech by others are somehow necessary to 
make voluntary advertisements nonmisleading for consumers. 73 
Justice Thomas and Justice Ginsburg commented directly on the confu-
sion that the Court's case law and comments have engendered in their 
joint dissent from the Court's denial of certiorari in a case in which the 
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a Florida statute imposing dis-
closure requirements on dentists who practice implant dentistry.74 The 
two justices argued that the Court should "provide lower courts with 
guidance on the subject of state-mandated disclaimers," and distin-
guished Zauderer as insufficient to validate the "government-scripted 
disclaimer" at issue in that case.75 
Most recently, eight members of the Court avoided addressing the 
outer boundaries of Zauderer's applicability by finding that a disclosure 
requirement imposed on bankruptcy attorneys was subject to lenient ra-
tional basis review because the government's purpose was to correct 
misleading commercial speech. 76 Justice Thomas concurred, agreeing to 
resolve the case pursuant to Zauderer, but indicating that he would be 
willing to reexamine whether its standard "provide[s] sufficient First 
Amendment protection against government-mandated disclosures" in an 
. 77 
appropnate case. 
71. 533U.S.405(2001). 
72. Id. at408-409. 
73. Id. at 416 (citation omitted). The Justices in the majority were Kennedy, Rehnquist , Ste-
vens, Scalia, Souter and Thomas. 
74. Borgner v. Fla. Bd. of Dentistry , 537 U.S. 1080, 1080 (2002). 
75. Id. The Justices also noted that the dentist "also raises doubts about whether the Eleventh 
Circuit ' s conclusion is consistent with Ibanez." Id. 
76. Milavetz , Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1339 (2010). 
77. Id. at 1342-45 & n.l (expressing doubt that the lesser burden that disclosure requirements 
may impose on speakers "justifies an entirely different standard of review for regulations that com-
pel, rather than suppress, commercial speech"). 
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B. The Consequences of Applying Commercial Speech Restraint Analysis 
to Information Disclosure Requirements 
Most of the commercial speech jurisprudence has developed in the 
context of speech restraints. The general speech-protective trend appar-
ent in these cases, as well as the specific judgments that guide the 
Court's application of the prongs of the Central Hudson test, provide 
important background that helps to explain the uncertainty in the current 
jurisprudence of disclosure requirements. The cases also provide a fore-
shadowing of the limitations government regulators would face if a ma-
jority of the Court were to limit the application of 'Zauderer' s deferential 
review standard to disclosure requirements imposed to correct deceptive 
or misleading commercial speech. 
In its most recent articulation, the Court confirmed that "[t]he Cen-
tral Hudson test is significantly stricter than the rational basis test,"78 
which it described as follows: 
[W]e ask as a threshold matter whether the commercial speech con-
cerns unlawful activity or is misleading . If so, then the speech is not 
protected by the First Amendment. If the speech concerns lawful ac-
tivity and is not misleading, however, we next ask "whether the as-
serted governmental interest is substantial." If it is, then we "deter-
mine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental in-
terest asserted ," and, finally, "whether it is not more extensive than is 
necessary to serve that interest." Each of these latter three inquiries 
must be answered in the affirmative for the regulation to be found 
constitutional. 79 
This section discusses the consequences of transposing each of 
these "stricter" speech restraint inquiries into the analysis of disclosure 
requirements imposed on commercial speech. 
l. Deceptive or Misleading Speech 
Central Hudson's first prong most obviously incorporates the criti-
cal differences the Court has identified between commercial and other 
types of speech. Although content discrimination is highly suspect with 
respect to non-commercial speech, this prong permits governments to 
suppress entirely commercial speech that is "more likely to deceive the 
public than to inform it."80 While a deferential approach to government 
judgments could provide wide latitude to restrict commercial speech, the 
choice apparent in the speech restraint cases is instead that the Court will 
carefully scrutinize a government determination that commercial speech 
should be suppressed to protect consumers from being deceived. The 
78. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 374 (2002). 
79. Id. at 357 (citations omitted). 
80. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563 
(1980). 
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Court has clarified that government authority to suppress commercial 
speech entirely extends only to speech that is in fact deceptive or "inher-
ently misleading." 81 The Court requires proof to find speech in fact de-
ceptive, 82 and will exercise de novo review to determine whether a 
statement is inherently misleading. 83 It has rejected state determinations 
that certain advertising claims met either of these standards, noting "the 
complete absence of any evidence of deception" 84 and opining that 
members of the public are generally sophisticated enough to recognize 
the limits of advertising and are not as easily misled as would-be regula-
tors claim them to be. 85 
By contrast, the Court tends to accord more deference to govern-
ment determinations that commercial speech may mislead consumers 
when the regulatory means are mandated disclosure rather than restric-
tion of speech. The Court has repeatedly emphasized that disclosure re-
quirements are less burdensome alternatives to restrictions of commercial 
speech. Despite use of the same word, the Court in z.auderer seemed to 
apply different degrees of deference to the State's assertions that the at-
torney's speech was "deceptive" according to the remedy the State 
sought to apply.86 Since z.auderer, the Court has changed its wording 
somewhat, acknowledging that a government's discretion to impose dis-
closure requirements extends beyond what is required to justify a speech 
restraint, to supplementing speech that is "potentially misleading." 87 
While it has seemed to say that, even when imposing a disclosure 
requirement, a government regulator must demonstrate the "harms it 
recites are real,"88 most recently, eight members of the Court signed on 
to a reiteration of z.auderer's conclusion that a "possibility of deception" 
may be so "self-evident" that no specific proof by the government regu-
81. See Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91, 110 (1990) ("A 
State may not ... completely ban statements that are not actually or inherently misleading."). 
82. See id. at 106 ("Given the complete absence of any evidence of deception in the present 
case, we must reject the contention that petititioner's letterhead is actually misleading."). 
83. See id. at 108. 
84. Id. at 106. 
85. See Peel, 496 U.S. at 105 ("We reject the paternalistic assumption that the recipients of 
petititioner's letterhead are no more discriminating than the audience for children's television."); 
Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 374-75 (1977) (rejecting the assumption "that the public is 
not sophisticated enough to realize the limitations of advertising" as based on an "underestimation of 
the public"). 
86. Compare Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 
U.S. 626, 648 (1985) (rejecting State's contention that illustrations in advertisements created "unac-
ceptable risks that the public will be misled, manipulated , or confused" as sufficient to justify sup-
pressing them), with id. at 652- 53 (accepting State ' s contention that the attorney 's reference to 
"fees" without mention of "costs" was "deceptive" where the remedy was a disclosure requirement). 
87. See, e.g., Wine & Spirits Retailers, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 481 F.3d I, 8-9 (1st Cir. 2007) 
("(T]he Court has made a doctrinal refinement, distinguishing in the professional services context 
between commercial speech that is inherently or actually misleading and commercial speech that is 
only potentially misleading . ... We need not (and do not) decide the issue, but we note that recent 
decisions have applied this dichotomy beyond the professional services context.") . 
88. Ibanez v. Fla Dep't of Bus. & Prof! Regulation, Bd. of Accountancy, 512 U.S. 136, 146 
(1994) (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 771 (1993)) . 
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lator is required to justify mandating certain information be disclosed in 
connection with commercial speech. 89 
But even applying the greater deference to government judgments 
that commercial speech has the potential to deceive will not obviously 
validate many modern disclosure requirements regulators impose to ful-
fill objectives other than preventing consumers from being misled by 
uncorrected speech. That is, graphic cigarette warnings, calorie counts on 
fast food, and statements about the adverse environmental impact of the 
products on which they appear do not counter commercial speech the 
Court would find has a self-evident "tendency to rnislead." 9° Conse-
quently, were the Court to limit 'Zauderer's deferential review to disclo-
sure requirements that serve the purpose of preventing actual or potential 
consumer deception, the remaining three prongs of the Central Hudson 
test would become relevant to determining the constitutionality of the 
many disclosure requirements that serve other regulatory purposes. 
2. Substantial Purpose 
Central Hudson's second prong requires the government to estab-
lish a "substantial" purpose for its regulation. 91 It is in this purpose in-
quiry where a majority of the justices have drawn a sharp line between 
unconstitutional and permissible commercial speech regulations. Early 
on, the Court rejected what it characterized as the "highly paternalistic 
approach" of restricting commercial speech to protect people from "the 
reactions it is assumed [they] will have to the free flow of ... infonna-
tion."92 Specifically, governments have often sought to achieve their va-
lid regulatory objective of reducing demand for a product by imposing 
advertising restrictions on its producers. Governments' reasons for re-
ducing demand may be to promote public health, 93 to conserve scarce 
resources,
94 to stabilize economic activity, 95 or to limit the spread of 
"vice" activity. 96 In each instance, the government regulator reasoned 
that the advertising it restricted, if allowed, would influence consumer 
89. Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1340 (2010) (quot-
ing Zauderer , 471 U.S. at 652-53). 
90. Milavetz, 130 S. Ct. at 1340 (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 652-53); see, e.g., Nat' ] Elec. 
Mfrs. Ass'n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 115 (2001) (observing that the requirement that products 
containing mercury disclose it served the purposes of providing information and protecting the 
environment, not preventing consumers from being deceived). 
91. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 
(1980). 
92. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 769-70 
(1976). 
93. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 556 (2001) (reducing underage smok-
ing); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 504 (1996) (plurality opinion) (reducing 
alcohol consumption). 
94. See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 560 (conserving electricity). 
95. See Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Twp. of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 95-96 (1977) (preventing 
"white flight" and blight). 
96. See Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 182, 185 
( 1999) (noting that the Fifth Circuit labeled gambling as "vice activity"). 
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activity in a way that would undermine the public interest, even if many 
of the individual decisions based on unrestricted advertising might in fact 
be in the rational self interest of the individual decisionmaker. 97 That is, 
governments have sought to modify consumer behavior because they 
have determined that the result of aggregated self interested individual 
purchasing behavior would undermine a public interest. 
Although the Court has acknowledged that regulating to modify 
consumer purchasing behavior to achieve a public purpose is within gov-
ernments' legitimate authority, it has emphasized that it will view such 
regulations with great skepticism when they take the form of speech re-
strictions. Restricting speech is a constitutionally offensive means of 
achieving the government's legitimate citizen "protectiveness" objective 
because its effectiveness "rests ... on the advantages of their [citizens] 
being kept in ignorance." 98 With increasing vehemence, the Court and 
individual justices have condemned the "paternalistic assumption that the 
public will use truthful, nonmisleading information unwisely," and the 
Court has invalidated speech-suppressing regulations that are based upon 
that assumption. 99 The alternative that the Constitution requires speech 
restrictions based on the "offensive assumption that the public will re-
spond 'irrationally' to the truth" 100 is to "open the channels of communi-
cation" so that people can be "well enough informed" to "perceive their 
own best interests." 101 
It is unclear precisely which characteristics of a regulation must ex-
ist for particular justices to label a government regulation as unconstitu-
tionally "paternalistic." All of the regulations condemned by the Court 
on this basis have restricted commercial speech and some of the trouble-
some characteristics noted by the Court and individual justices are spe-
cific to speech restraints. 102 One troublesome characteristic is that speech 
restraints modify consumer behavior by "keep[ing] people in the dark for 
... their own good." !03 Another is a political process concern that re-
stricting speech "to pursue a nonspeech-related policy" may "screen 
from public view the underlying government policy ."104 Additionally, the 
Court continues to emphasize that disclosure requirements are a "far less 
97. See Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 387 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
("[T]he Government fears the safety consequences . . . [that] flow from the adverse cumulative 
effects of multiple individual decisions each of which may seem perfectly reasonable considered on 
its own."). 
98. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council , Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 769 
(1976). 
99. 44 Liquormart , Inc. v. Rhode Island , 517 U.S. 484, 497 (1996) (plurality opinion). 
100. Id. at 503 (quoting Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Twp. of Willingboro , 431 U.S. 85, 96 
(1977)). 
101. Va. State Bd. of Pharmnc y, 425 U.S. at 770. 
102. See, e.g., Greater New Orleans Broad . Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 193 
(]999). 
I 03. 44 Liquormnrt , 517 U.S. at 503. 
104. Id. at 500 (quoting Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 
U.S. 557, 566 n.9 (1980)). 
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restrictive alternative" than advertising restrictions, although it is unclear 
the extent to which this conclusion extends beyond correcting "mislead-
ing" advertisements. 105 
By contrast, some statements by individual justices and combina-
tions of justices suggest a view that the Constitution prohibits the more 
general regulation of commercial speech for "paternalistic" behavior 
modification purposes. 106 Justice Thomas has most vociferously advo-
cated the view that strict scrutiny should apply to government regulations 
that depend on the content of commercial speech, unless the government 
can demonstrate that the speech is untruthful or misleading. 107 Other jus-
tices have joined in similar reasoning in some cases. 108 Nevertheless, 
these justices and others have also emphasized that such content based 
purposes are particularly problematic in the context of broad speech re-
strictions, which they characterized as "blanket bans" that "entirely sup-
press" speech, '09 and that governments may require the disclosure of at 
least some types of "beneficial consumer information" without running 
afoul of the anti-paternalistic purpose rule that they interpret the Consti-
tution to contain. 11° Consequently, it is unclear how a majority of the 
Court would evaluate a disclosure requirement aimed to counter the po-
tentially persuasive, as opposed to deceptive, content of commercial 
speech under Central Hudson's second prong. 
105. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 376 (2002) ("Even if the Government 
did argue that it had an interest in preventing misleading advertisements , this interest could be satis-
fied by the far less restrictive alternative of requiring each compounded drug to be labeled with a 
warning that the drug had not undergone FDA testing and that its risks were unknown."). 
106. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart , 5 I 7 U.S. at 5 I 8 (Thomas, J., concurring) . 
107. Milavetz , Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1342 (2010) (Tho-
mas, J., concurring); Thompson, 535 U.S. at 377 (Thomas, J., concurring); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. 
Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 575 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring); 44Liquormart ,5 17 U.S. at 518 (Thomas , 
J., concurring). 
108. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 501 (plurality opinion) ("(W]hen a State entirely prohibits the 
dissemination of truthful , nonmisleading commercial messages for reasons unrelated to the preserva-
tion of a fair bargaining process , there is far Jess reason to depart from the rigorous review that the 
First Amendment generally demands ."). By contrast, Justices Stevens and Ginsburg joined Justice 
Breyer's dissent in Thompson, accepting the Federal Drug Administration 's consumer demand 
modification purpose for restricting compounded drug advertising. Thompson, 535 U.S. at 382 
(Breyer, J., dissenting). This may be because the FDA's restrictions were tailored and not a "com-
plete ban." 
l 09. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, 5 I 7 U.S. at 500 (plurality opinion) ("'[S]pecial care' should 
attend the review of ... blanket bans .... ") (citing Cent. Hudson, 447 at 566 n.9); Peel v. Attorney 
Registration and Disciplinary Comm ' n of Ill., 496 U.S. 91, 110 n.17 (1990) (plurality opinion) ("[A] 
holding that a total ban is unconstitutional does not necessarily preclude less restrictive regulation of 
commercial speech."); Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566 n.9 ("We review with special care regulations 
that entirely suppress commercial speech in order to pursue a nonspeech-related policy."). 
I JO. 44 Liquormart, 5 I 7 U.S. at 501 (plurality opinion) ("When a State regulates commercial 
messages to protect consumers from misleading , deceptive, or aggressive sales practices, or requires 
the disclosure of beneficial consumer information , the purpose of its regulation is consistent with the 
reasons for according constitutional protection to commercial speech and therefore justifies Jess than 
strict review."). 
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3. Directly Advance 
Prong three of the Central Hudson test looks to the relationship of 
the government's means to its end. 111 Speech restrictions must directly 
advance the government's substantial purpose for imposing the regula-
tion. 112 The Court has applied this test with increasing rigor, questioning 
the details of government line-drawing and demanding proof that par-
ticular restrictions will actually advance the government objective sub-
stantially.113 Where government has imposed speech restrictions for the 
purpose of reducing demand as the intermediary means to achieving a 
public end, the Court has examined closely whether the restriction im-
posed will actually achieve the specific type of demand reduction the 
government asserts. In 44 Liquormart, a four justice plurality refused to 
assume, without findings of fact or evidentiary support, that restricting 
price advertising of alcohol would "significantly reduce alcohol con-
sumption," finding, among other things, that a lack of such information is 
unlikely to deter heavy drinkers. 114 In both Greater New Orleans Broad-
casting Ass'n, Inc. v. United States 115 and Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co.,116 
the Court rejected the one-step-at-a-time reasoning, failing to find a close 
enough fit between the government's purpose and its means because of 
contradictions contained in the overall regulatory schemes for alcohol 
and gambling, respectively. 117 And in Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 118 
a plurality similarly rejected the state's assertion that requiring tobacco 
advertising be at five feet or higher directly advanced its goal of curbing 
minors' demand for cigarettes because, "Not all children are less than 5 
feet tall, and those who are certainly have the ability to look up and take 
in their surroundings." 119 Finally, in Thompson v. Western States Medical 
Center, 120 the Court seemed to say that restricting advertisements to re-
duce consumer demand as a means to protect those same consumers 
"from making bad decisions with the information" per se does not di-
rectly advance the government's interest. 121 Obviously, this close exami-
nation of means-end fit applied to disclosure requirements would invali-
date more of them than the Zauderer rational basis review. 
111. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. 
112. Id. 
113. See, e.g., 44 Uquormart , 517 U.S. at 505. 
I 14. Id. (requiring a strong showing by the State because of the "drastic nature of its chosen 
means"). 
115. 527 U.S. 173 (1999). 
I 16. 514 U.S. 476 (1995). 
117. Greater New Orleans, 527 U.S. at 190-93; Rubin , 514 U.S. at 489. 
I I 8. 533 U.S. 525 (200 I). 
I 19. Id. at 566 (plurality opinion). 
120. 535 U.S. 357 (2002). 
121. Id. at 374-76 ("Even if the Government had asserted an interest in preventing people who 
do not need compounded drugs from obtaining those drugs, the statute does not directly advance that 
interest. ... [T]he statute does not directly forbid such sales. It instead restricts advertising, of course 
not just to those who do not need compounded drugs , but also to individuals who do need com-
pounded drugs and their doctors. "). 
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4. Alternate Means 
When it reaches the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test, the 
Court inquires whether the regulation is "more extensive than is neces-
sary to serve [the government's] interest." 122 The Court has applied this 
requirement increasingly rigorously as well, looking both to whether the 
restriction imposed is well tailored to the government's purpose, 123 and 
to whether alternative types of regulations that do not restrict speech 
could adequately accomplish the government's objective. 124 According to 
the Court, "[R]egulating speech must be a last-not first-resort." 125 A 
number of speech restrictions imposed to reduce consumer demand have 
failed this fourth prong inquiry. 126 The Court has consistently indicated 
that direct, non-speech regulations are preferable to advertising restric-
tions, 127 although it has also recited more narrowly tailored speech re-
strictions as available alternatives that cause the regulation under review 
to fail the fourth prong inquiry. 128 In connection with this inquiry, the 
Court has frequently mentioned that disclosure requirements are constitu-
tionally preferable, less-restrictive means to speech suppression, 129 and 
that governments are free to engage in their own speech to counter the 
content of advertisements. 13° Consequently, the extent to which the Court 
would invalidate disclosure requirements because even less restrictive 
122. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 
(1980). 
123. See Lorillard , 533 U.S. at 563 ("The uniformly broad sweep of the geographical limitation 
demonstrates a lack of tailoring."). 
124. Thompson, 535 U.S. at 371 ("In previous cases addressing this final prong of the Central 
Hudson test, we have made clear that if the Government could achieve its interests in a manner that 
does not restrict speech, or that restricts less speech, the Government must do so."). 
125. Id. at 373. 
126. Id. at 371 (prescription drugs); wrillard, 533 U.S. at 561 (cigarettes); Rubin v. Coors 
Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 490-91 (1995) (alcohol). 
127. Thompson , 535 U.S. at 372 ("Several non-speech-related means of drawing a line between 
compounding and large-scale manufacturing [of drugs] might be possible here."); Rubin, 514 U.S. at 
490-91 (one alternative available to prohibiting alcohol content advertising of beer is "directly 
limiting the alcohol content of beers"); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 507 
(1996) ("[H]igher prices [for alcohol] can be maintained either by direct regulation or by increased 
taxation."); Linmark Assoc. , Inc. v. Twp. of Willingboro , 431 U.S. 85, 97 (1977) (financial incen-
tives to reduce home sales are an available alternative to restricting display of For Sale signs). 
128. Rubin, 514 U.S. at 490-91 (alternatives to alcohol content advertising for all beer are 
"prohibiting marketing efforts emphasizing high alcohol strength (which is apparently the policy in 
some other western nations) , or limiting the labeling ban only to malt liquors, which is the segment 
of the market that allegedly is threatened with a strength war"). 
129. Thompson, 535 U.S. at 376; Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of 
N. Y., 447 U.S. 557, 571 (1980) (reasoning that in order to address its interest in promoting energy 
conservation, the government "might , for example, require that the [utility's] advertisements include 
information about the relative efficiency and expense of the offered service"); Bates v. State Bar of 
Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 375 (1977) ("[Dhe preferred remedy is more disclosure , rather than less."); Va. 
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 772 n.24 (1976) (sug-
gesting that governments may "require that a commercial message appear in such a form, or include 
such additional information , warnings, and disclaimers , as are necessary to prevent its being decep-
tive"). 
130. See Linmark Assoc., Inc. v. Twp. of Willingboro , 431 U.S. 85, 97 (1977) (suggesting the 
alternative of government counter-speech). 
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means of achieving the government's purpose are available, such as di-
rect regulation or government speech, is unclear. 
C. Disclosure Requirements in the Lower Courts 
The intersection of the Court's early distinction between commer-
cial speech disclosure requirements and restraints imposed on commer-
cial speech creates a number of open issues with respect to government 
authority to mandate speech on product labels. 
1. What is the test? 
Lower courts have differed as to whether 'Zauderer's rational basis 
review applies to all instances where governments mandate disclosure of 
commercial information, or whether it is limited to instances where gov-
ernments act for the purpose of preventing consumer deception. 
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has addressed this question in 
a series of recent cases. In International Dairy Foods Ass'n v. Amestoy 
(IDFA), 131 Judges Altimari and McLaughlin held for a two-judge major-
ity that dairy marketers had established a likelihood of success on the 
merits of their claim that a Vermont statutory requirement mandating 
producers to label certain dairy products-those made from milk derived 
from cows treated with the synthetic growth hormone rBST-violated 
the Constitution . 132 The court applied the Central Hudson test to find the 
disclosure requirement likely unconstitutional for lack of a substantial 
purpose without explicitly addressing whether 'Zauderer's rational basis 
test applied. 133 Judge Leval dissented, also without specifically distin-
guishing between the tests offered in Central Hudson and 'Zauderer. 134 
Instead, he argued both that the state's interests were substantial under 
Central Hudson, and that 'Zauderer' s distinction between "disclosure 
requirements and outright prohibitions on speech" rendered the Vermont 
· · · l 135 reqmrement const1tut10na . 
Five years later, in National Electrical Manufacturers Ass'n v. Sor-
rell, 136 a unanimous panel composed of Chief Judge Walker, Judge Poo-
ler and then-Judge Sonia Sotomayor reversed and remanded a district 
court decision and ordered preliminarily enjoining application of Ver-
mont statutory and regulatory requirements that manufacturers label 
products to indicate they contain mercury and must be disposed of as 
hazardous waste .137 The district court relied on the prior decision in 
131. 92 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 1996). 
132. Id. at 74. 
133. Implicitly, the court seemed to limit 'Zauderer's application to disclosure requirements 
aimed at "preventing deception of consumers. " Id. (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary 
Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985)). 
134. Id. at 77- 78 (Leval, J ., dissenting). 
135. Id. at 81. 
136. 272 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2001). 
137. ld.at116 . 
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IDFA and, applying Central Hudson, found the plaintiff manufacturers' 
association likely to succeed on the merits of its constitutional claim. 138 
The circuit court directly addressed the different tests articulated in Cen-
tral Hudson and 'Z.auderer, and held that the district court had "misper-
ceived" which one applied to the disclosure requirement in that case. 139 
According to the court, the Free Speech Clause objectives underlying the 
distinction between disclosure requirements and restraints on speech 
meant that the "reasonable-relationship rule in 'Z.auderer" governed re-
view of the disclosure requirement before it, even though it "was not 
intended to prevent 'consumer confusion or deception' per se." 140 The 
court explained: 
Commercial disclosure requirements are treated differently from re-
strictions on commercial speech because mandated disclosure of ac-
curate, factual , commercial information does not offend the core First 
Amendment values of promoting efficient exchange of information 
or protecting individual liberty interests . Such disclosure furthers, ra-
ther than hinders, the First Amendment goal of the discovery of truth 
and contributes to the efficiency of the "marketplace of ideas." Pro-
tection of the robust and free flow of accurate information is the prin-
cipal First Amendment justification for protecting commercial 
speech, and requiring disclosure of truthful information promotes that 
goal. In such a case, then, less exacting scrutiny is required than 
where truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech is restricted. 
Additionally , the individual liberty interests guarded by the First 
Amendment , which may be impaired when personal or political 
speech is mandated by the state are not ordinarily implicated by 
compelled commercial disclosure. Required disclosure of accurate, 
factual commercial information presents little risk that the state is 
forcing speakers to adopt disagreeable state-sanctioned positions, 
suppressing dissent , confounding the speaker's attempts to participate 
in self-governance , or interfering with an individual's right to define 
d h. h 1· 141 an express 1s or er own persona 1ty. 
The court thus concluded that "'Z.auderer, not [Central Hudson] , de-
scribe[d] the relationship between means and ends demanded by the First 
Amendment in compelled commercial disclosure cases. The Central 
Hudson test should be applied to statutes that restrict commercial 
speech." 142 It distinguished its prior decision in IDFA as "expressly lim-
ited to cases in which a state disclosure requirement is supported by no 
interest other than the gratification of 'consumer curiosity,"' noting that 
"because our decision in IDFA was predicated on the state's inability to 
138. Nat'l Elec. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Sorrell, 72 F. Supp. 2d 449, 456. (D. Vt. 1999). 
139. Sorrell , 272 F.3d at I 13. 
140. Id. at I 15 (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of 
Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985)). 
141. Id. at I 13- 14 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted). 
142. Id. at 115. 
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identify a sufficient legitimate state interest, we did not reach the proper 
relationship between a disclosure regulation's means and its ends, the 
issue we face here." 143 It commented as well that applying the Central 
Hudson test to government disclosure requirements not aimed specifi-
cally at preventing consumer deception would "expose [many] long-
established programs to searching scrutiny by unelected courts. Such a 
result is neither wise nor constitutionally required." 144 
In a later decision, with the panel again including Judge Poole and 
then-Judge Sotomayor, the court rejected the New York State Restaurant 
Association's (NYSRA) argument that New York City's requirement 
that restaurants post the calorie content of food should be reviewed under 
the Central Hudson test because its purpose was to combat obesity rather 
than prevent consumer deception, and because the plaintiff association 
disputed that the disclosure requirement would fulfill that purpose. 145 The 
court reiterated its Sorrell reasoning "that Zauderer ' s holding was broad 
enough to encompass nonmisleading disclosure requirements" 146 and that 
"Zauderer, not Central Hudson . .. describes the relationship between 
means and ends demanded by the First Amendment in compelled com-
mercial disclosure cases." 147 
The Second Circuit panel noted that "[ w ]e have not been alone in 
accepting this broader reading," 148 citing the First Circuit's decision in 
Pharmaceutical Care Management Ass'n v. Rowe. 149 In that case, the 
court applied Zauderer to Maine's statutory requirement that middlemen 
entities in the pharmaceutical distribution network disclose certain in-
formation about their operations and finances as a condition for doing 
business in the state.150 The court rejected plaintiffs argument that "Zau-
derer is ' limited to potentially deceptive advertising directed at consum-
ers,"' noting that it had "found no cases limiting Zauderer in such a 
way." 151 The weight of the lower court precedent, therefore, interprets 
the Zauderer rational basis test to apply to disclosure requirements gen-
143. Id. at 115 n.6. 
144. Id. at 116 (noting that "[i]nnumerable federal and state regulatory programs require the 
disclosure of product and other commercial information ," including reporting of federal election 
campaign contributions , securities disclosure s, tobacco labeling, nutritional labeling, reporting of 
pollutant concentrations in water, reporting of releases of toxic substances, disclosures in prescrip-
tion drug advertisements, posting notification of workplace hazards, warning of potential exposure to 
hazardous substances, and disclosure of pesticide formulas) (citations omitted). 
145. N.Y. State Rest. Ass'n v. N.Y. City Bd. of Health (NYSRA ), 556 F.3d 114, 132- 33 (2d. 
Cir. 2009). 
146. Id . at 133. 
147. Id. (quoting Sorrell , 272 F.3d at I 15) (alteration in original). 
148. NYSRA , 556 F.3d at 133 
149. 429 F.3d 294 (!st Cir. 2005). 
150. ld.at316 . 
151. Id. at 310 n.8. 
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erally, even if they are not specifically or exclusively aimed at preventing 
d · 152 consumer eception. 
Other courts, however, have applied the Central Hudson test to dis-
closure requirements, specifically in the context of advertising by law-
yers and other professionals, where the Court's decision in Ibanez mud-
dies the precedent. In Borgner v. Brooks, 153 the case in which Justices 
Thomas and Ginsburg dissented from denial of the writ of certiorari , 154 
both the district court and the appellate court applied the Central Hudson 
test to a state requirement that dentists include a disclaimer with their 
advertisements of an implant dentistry specialty. 155 Neither acknowl-
edged the option of lower level review that 'Zauderer presented. 156 
In Mason v. Florida Bar, 157 the Eleventh Circuit confronted a state 
bar rule that on its face prohibited attorneys from making certain types of 
"self laudatory" statements without a lengthy disclaimer in the lawyer's 
advertising. 158 Confronted with the state bar's argument that "its restric-
tion on [the plaintiff attorney's] speech should be upheld because it has 
not insisted upon an outright ban on speech, but merely requires the use 
of a disclaimer," 159 the court interpreted the Supreme Court's decision in 
Ibanez to require that "[e]ven partial restrictions on commercial speech 
must be supported by a showing of some identifiable harm." 160 It held 
"that the Bar is not relieved of its burden to identify a genuine threat of 
152. See, e.g., Conn. Bar Assoc. v. United States, 394 B.R. 274, 286-87 (0. Conn . 2008) 
(finding that for review of a required disclosure for bankruptcy attorneys "the reasonable relation test 
is more appropriate," but also determining that the required disclosures are not misleading, are not 
overbroad, and "advance[] a sufficiently compelling government interest and do[] not unduly burden 
the attorney-client relationship "); European Connections & Tours, Inc. v. Gonzales, 480 F. Supp. 2d 
1355, 1371-72 (N.D. Ga. 2007) ("IMBRA 's disclo sure requirements are properly analyzed under 
'lauderer and must be upheld if there is a reasonable relationship to a legitimate government inter-
est. ... IMBRA 's disclosure requirements are reasonably related to Congress' legitimate interest in 
preventing fraud and deception and addressing domestic abuse and human trafficking against so-
called 'ma il-order brides."'); Beeman v. Anthem Prescription Mgmt., Inc., No. EDCV 04-407 -V AP 
(SGLx), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39779, at *36- 39 (C.D. Cal. May 4, 2007) (addressing the question 
whether strict scrutiny or rational basis scrutiny applied to state statutory requirement that pharma-
cies conduct and distribut e a bi-yearly rice survey , and concluding that no scrutiny applied because 
the statistics were not required to be distributed with advertising materials and so did not burden 
commercial speech); Envtl. Def. Ctr., Inc. v. EPA, 344 F.3d 832, 845 n.18 (9th Cir. 2003) (subject-
ing EPA rule that require s municipalities to distribute information about the hazards of storm water 
run-off to unspecific low level scrutiny); Texans Against Censorship, Inc. v. State Bar of Tex., 888 
F. Supp. 1328, 1357- 59 (E.D. Tex. 1995), ajf'd, 100 F.3d 953 (5th Cir. 1996). 
153. 284 F.3d 1204 (I Ith Cir. 2002). 
154. Borgner v. Aa. Bd. of Dentistry, 537 U.S. 1080 (2002) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
155. Borgner, 284 F.3d at 1210. 
156. Id. at 1214 (citing Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of 
Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) for the rule that "[d]isclai mers are significantly different than out-
right bans on commercial speech," but applying the Central Hudson test); Borgner v. Brooks, 152 F. 
Supp. 2d 1317, 1324 (2001) (citing 'lauderer, 471 U.S. at 648-49 for the rule that restrictions on 
advertising cannot be based on '"uns upported assertions' without 'evide nce or authority of any 
kind'"). 
157. 
158. 
159. 
160. 
208 F.3d 952 (11th Cir. 2000). 
Id. at 954. 
Id. at 958. 
Id. 
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danger simply because it requires a disclaimer, rather than a complete 
ban on ... speech," and that the Bar "has failed to satisfy the third prong 
of Central Hudson." 161 Similarly, the district court in Schwartz v. 
Welch 162 reviewed a series of disclosure requirements imposed on lawyer 
advertising under the Central Hudson test, characterizing the rules as 
imposing "restrictions" because the requirements caused the lawyer-
plaintiffs to modify their advertisements and forego certain advertise-
ment techniques. 163 A Massachusetts state court recently discussed the 
difficulty of analyzing disclosure requirements coupled with an enforce-
ment mechanism present in the context of mandated security offering 
registration and disclosure. 164 The problem of characterization arises 
because the disclosure requirement serves "not to restrict speech, but to 
expand it," but the "necessary corollary" of such a scheme is the prohibi-
tion of speech without the required disclaimer. 165 The enforcement me-
chanism "inherently restrict[s] speech," but "without such prohibitions it 
is difficult to imagine how a ... disclosure system could operate with 
any degree of effectiveness." 166 
In Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 167 the district 
court applied the Central Hudson test to a disclaimer imposed on law-
yers.168 The appellate court agreed that 'Zauderer applied only to disclo-
sure requirements imposed for the purpose of preventing deception, but 
applied that test because it determined that this was the government's 
purpose in that case.169 The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's 
reasoning, 170 which meant that it did not resolve whether 'Zauderer' s 
"less exacting scrutiny" applies to disclosure requirements imposed for 
purposes other than correcting potentially deceptive commercial speech. 
Additionally, although the case before it did not depend upon the distinc-
tion, the Ninth Circuit recently appears to have assumed that the decep-
tion prevention purpose is essential to the application of the 'Zauderer 
standard. 171 
161. Id. 
162. 890 F. Supp. 565 (S.D. Miss. 1995). 
163. Id. at 573-74. 
164. Bulldog Investors Gen. P'ship v. Galvin , No. 07-1261-BLS2 , 2007 WL 4647112, at *9-
* IO (Mass. Dec. 26, 2007). 
165. Id. at *9- *IO. 
166. Id . at *10. 
167. 541 F.3d 785 (8th Cir. 2008). 
168. Id. at 796. 
169. Id. at 796 ("[R]estrictions on non-deceptive advertising are reviewed under intermediate 
scrutiny . . .. The district court in this case reviewed § 528's disclosure requirements under the inter-
mediate scrutiny standard, but we conclude that rational basis review is proper. The disclosure 
requirements here, like those in 'Zauderer , are intended to avoid potentially deceptive advertising."). 
170. Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. , v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, I 339 (2010) (apply-
ing the deferential review of 'Zauderer because the statute imposed a disclosure requirement and 
because it "is directed at misleading commercial speech"). 
171. Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 966 (9th Cir. 2009) 
("Compelled disclosures , justified by the need to 'dissipate the possibility of consumer confusion or 
deception ,' are pennissible if the 'disclosure requirements are reasonably related to the State's inter-
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2. Can The Purpose Be "Paternalistic"? 
The "paternalism" the Court condemns in the speech restraint cases 
involves a three-step ends/means continuum: (1) a government agency 
suppresses speech (2) to modify individual buyer/seller transactions (3) 
to achieve a public purpose, which is something other than preventing 
consumer deception. Steps two and three are commonplace aims of le-
gitimate non-speech regulatory actions. It is the very essence of regula-
tion to restrict the freedom of individual marketplace actors in some in-
stances to serve the democratic government's conception of the public 
interest. The many types of public interests served by these actions are 
not exclusively, or even primarily, preventing consumer deception. 
As noted above, a number of courts have rejected claims by vendors 
that Zauderer's rational basis review is limited to disclosure require-
ments that are intended to protect consumers from deception. 172 These 
courts have reasoned that the "free flow of information" value that un-
derpins the protection of commercial speech must extend to render a 
government's purpose to provide more information to aid fully informed 
consumer decision-making legitimate, even if the regulator did not im-
pose the disclosure requirement to correct affirmatively deceptive or 
misleading vendor speech . 173 Extended this far, the reasoning remains 
consistent with that articulated by the Court in condemning "paternalis-
tic" speech restraints. 174 Many existing disclosure requirements can be 
characterized as intended simply to provide additional information, 
which will assist consumers in making decisions that reflect their own 
rational self-interests and which the consumers would not know was in 
their interest without government mandated disclosure. Requirements 
that vendors label products as kosher, 175 as containing ingredients to 
which certain consumers may have an allergic reaction, 176 or with safe 
handling advice 177 fall into this category. 
But many disclosure requirements have purposes that extend be-
yond merely facilitating the exercise of each individual consumer's ra-
est in preventing deception of customers."' (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of 
the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985))) . 
172. See supra text accompanying notes 131-171. 
173. See supra text accompanying notes 131- 171. 
174. See, e.g., 44 Liquorman , Inc. v. Rhode Island , 517 U.S. 484 , 501 (1996) (less than strict 
judicial review is appropriate when states "require[] the disclosure of beneficial consumer informa-
tion"). 
175. See, e.g., N.Y . AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW §§ 201-a(I) , 201-c(l), invalidated by Commack 
Self-Service Kosher Meats , Inc. v. Weiss , 294 F.3d 415 (2d Cir. 2002) (establishment clause viola-
tion). 
176. See, e.g., Food Allergen Labeling and Consumer Protection Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. I 08-
282, 118 Stat. 905 , 905-11 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2006), available at 
http://www .fda.gov/Food/LabelingNutrition/FoodAllergensLabeling/GuidanceComplianceRegulator 
ylnformation/ucm I 06187 .htm. 
177. See, e.g., Mandatory Safe Handling Statements on Labeling of Raw Meat and Poultry 
Products , 9 C.F.R. §§ 317.2, 317.5, 381.125, 381.134 (1994). 
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tional self-interest. Often, government regulators impose disclosure re-
quirements for the purpose of modifying the "reactions" that they antici-
pate consumers will have to un-supplemented advertiser information. 178 
Regulators require disclosure because of "a fear that people would make 
bad decisions" if given only the information provided by the vendors. 179 
That is, an explicit government purpose is to change individual product 
purchasing behavior to implement a judgment about "what the govern-
ment perceives to be their own good," 180 or, often, and more specifically, 
what the government has determined is in the public good. 
Labeling requirements may be part of a comprehensive regulatory 
scheme that makes clear the consumer behavior modification objective. 
Cigarette package labeling requirements exist within a complex structure 
of many different federal, state, and local regulations, including direct 
marketing restrictions, taxes, and public education efforts aimed at serv-
ing the public interest in reducing demand for a product that results in 
high social and economic costs. 181 An explicit strategy of cigarette regu-
lations is to change public attitudes about the desirability of the prod-
uct-to "denormalize" tobacco use. 182 
Similar multi-level and multi-faceted regulatory structures with the 
underlying agenda of changing public attitudes and purchasing behavior 
exist with respect to other products governments have identified as caus-
ing harms to public health and resulting in high social and economic 
costs. 183 While a requirement that food manufacturers label products with 
sodium, sugar, or transfat can be characterized as a government effort to 
"open the channels of communication," another, more aggressive, pur-
pose is obvious as well. Each requirement is part of a broader strategy to 
promote healthy food consumption, not just any food consumption ra-
tional consumers may happen to choose. And the judgment of what con-
stitutes "healthy" food consumption can be controversial. 184 Conse-
quently, many existing labeling requirements depend upon government 
authority to require disclosure of information because of the "reactions" 
178. See Rebecca Tushnet , It Depends on What the Meaning of "False" Is: Falsity and Mis-
leadingness in Commercial Speech Doctrine, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 227, 250 & n.107 (2007) (dis-
cussing the "preference-shaping effects" of labeling requirements). 
179. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 374 (2002). 
180. 44 Liquormart , Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 503 (1996). 
181. See, e.g., TOBACCO CONTROL LEGAL CONSORTIUM, FEDERAL REGULATION OF TOBACCO: 
IMPACT ON STATE AND LocAL AUTHORITY (2009), available at http ://publichealthlawcenter.org/ 
topics/tobacco-control/federal-regulation-tobacco/federal-regulation-tobacco-collection. 
182. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Shewry, 423 F.3d 906, 912 (9th Cir. 2005) (describing 
campaign of California Department of Health Services "to 'de normali ze' smoking, by creating a 
climate in which smoking would seem less desirable and less socially acceptable ."). 
183. See, e.g., Penny Starr, First Lady Links Childhood Obesity to National Security in Launch 
of 'Let's Move ' Campaign, CNSNEWS.COM, Feb. 09, 2010, http://cn snews.com/news /article/61157 
(describing elements of anti-obesity campaign). 
184. See, e.g., John Tierney, Diet and Fat: A Severe Case of Mistaken Consensus, N.Y . TIMES, 
Oct. 9, 2007 , at Fl (describing controversy about USDA Food Pyramid and advice to eat a low-fat 
diet) , available at http://www .brown.ed u/Department s/Eco nomics/Diet %20and%2 0Fa t.pdf. 
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it presumes consumers will have to un-supplemented information and for 
the purpose of modifying consumer behavior to serve the government's 
determination of the public interest. 185 
The Second Circuit's three cases all involve labeling requirements 
where a government purpose to modify behavior is mixed with the pur-
pose to inform. In IDFA, the panel invalidated a Vermont requirement 
that milk manufacturers disclose use of the hormone rBST. 186 Vermont 
passed the law because its citizens wanted to know the information. 187 
The court held that "consumer curiosity" was not enough to justify im-
posing the disclosure requirement on the producer's commercial 
speech. 188 As the dissent pointed out , milk producers vigorously opposed 
the labeling requirement because of the reaction they feared consumers 
would have to it. 189 The milk producers also successfully argued that the 
information provided should have no impact on a reasonable consumer, 
because consumers should only be concerned about health effects of the 
hormone on the milk product, and that had not been scientifically dem-
onstrated. 190 That is, milk producers were concerned that consumers 
would react irrationally to the information provided at purchase of the 
product, despite the fact that the vendors remained free to provide what-
ever contrary information they wanted, at either that moment or in other 
advertising. 191 Specifically, the milk producers conceded the powerful 
persuasive effect of information provided at the product purchase mo-
ment. By requiring that the government provide a particular showing of 
harm in order to require disclosure , the majority interpreted the First 
Amendment as granting the milk producers a right of "concealment" in 
order to present their persuasive product messages in their own way.192 
The milk labeling controversy helps make clear that what is at stake on 
I 85. Regulators may also seek to influence producer behavior through imposition of labeling 
requirements because of the anticipated consumer behavior modification effect. When threatened 
with an upcoming trans fat labeling requirements many food producers abandoned using them to 
avoid the anticipated reaction of consumers to the disclosur e. See, e.g., LAWRENCE 0. GoST!N, 
PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 177 (2000) (describing decision of Kraft Foods to 
remove trans fats from Oreo cookies in anticipati on of mandatory labeling); Elise Golan, Fred Ku-
chler & Barry Krissoff , Do Food labels Make a Difference? ... Sometimes, AMBER WAVES, Nov. 
2007 , http ://www. ers. usda. gov I Amber Wa ves/Scri pis/print.asp ?page=/N ovember07 /Features/ 
FoodLabels.htm. 
186. Manufacturers could comply with the law by placing a small blue sticker on their milk , in 
conjunction with a sign posted by the retailers indicating that the sticker marked hormone-exposed 
milk. Int'I Dairy Foods Ass ' n v. Arnestoy , 92 F.3d 67, 69- 70 (2d Cir. 1996). 
187. Id. at 75- 76 (Leval , J. , dissenting) . 
I 88. Id. at 74 (majority opinion) ("[W]e hold that consumer curiosity alone is not a strong 
enough state interest to sustain the compulsion of even an accurate , factual statement in a commer -
cial context. ") (citation omitted). 
189. See id. at 80 (Leval , J ., dissenting). 
190. Id. at 73 (majority opinion) ("[nhe already extensive record in this case contains no 
scientific evidence . . . that rBST has any impact at all on dairy products ."). 
191. Id. at 80 (Leval, J ., dissenting) ("[The manufacturers] do not wish consumers to know that 
their milk products were produced by use of rBST because there are consumers who, for various 
reasons, prefer to avoid rBST. "). 
192. See id. at 74, 80. 
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both sides of the argument about the extent of government authority to 
impose disclosure requirements is the power to influence to modify con-
sumer behavior, not simply to inform it. 
The Second Circuit in Sorrell directly acknowledged the consumer 
behavior modification objective of the disclosure requirement. 193 The 
"overall goal" of the requirement that manufacturers label products con-
taining mercury with content and proper disposal information was not 
simply to inform consumers so that they could decide upon their own 
rational self-interests and pursue them. Rather, it was "plainly" to pursue 
the additional public interest in "reduc[ing] the amount of mercury re-
leased into the environment." 194 This purpose, the court noted, was "in-
extricably intertwined with the goal of increasing consumer awareness of 
the presence of mercury in a variety of products." 195 Increasing public 
awareness through mandated disclosure had the purpose of "encouraging 
... changes in consumer behavior." 196 Although the "change" the court 
referred to was in consumers' product disposal behavior, it is not hard to 
imagine that the required mercury content disclosures were also for the 
purpose of reducing demand for mercury containing products as well. 
The court nevertheless explicitly recited the linkage of disclosure re-
quirements, consumer behavior change, and fulfillment of the govern-
ment purpose as appropriate to demonstrate the reasonable ends-means 
relationship required by the Zauderer test. 197 
More recently, in reviewing calorie content disclosure requirements 
imposed on New York restaurants, the same court found these means 
rationally related to the city's purpose "to promote informed consumer 
decision-making so as to reduce obesity and the diseases associated with 
it." 198 Although the court noted that the city was not obliged to produce 
evidence to support its decision-making under the rational basis review 
applied, it listed much of the evidence the city chose to produce showing 
that obesity is a public health problem, that obesity correlates to eating in 
restaurants, and that "calorie information is most relevant to obesity pre-
vention. "199 The court thus concluded that the "calorie disclosure rules 
are clearly reasonably related to [the city's] goal of reducing obesity." 200 
193. See Nat ' ! Elec . Mfrs. Ass' n v. Sorrell , 272 F.3d 104, 115 (2d Cir. 2001). 
194. Id. 
195. Id. 
196. Id. 
197. Id. ("By encouraging such changes in consumer behavior , the labeling requirement is 
rationally related to the state ' s goal of reducing mercury contamination. "). 
198. N.Y. State Rest. Ass'n v. N.Y. City Bd. of Health (NYSRA), 556 F.3d 114, 134 (2d Cir. 
2009). 
199. Id. at 136 (quoting THE KEYSTONE FORUM ON AWAY-FROM-HOME FOODS: 
OPPORTUNITIES FOR PREVENTtNG WEIGHT GAIN AND OBESITY (2006)), available at 
http://www.fda .gov/Food/LabelingNutrition/ReportsResearch/ucm082064 .htm. 
200. NYSRA, 556 F.3d at 136. 
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These cases illustrate that the "purpose" behind modern labeling re-
quirements is more complex than the discussions in the speech restraint 
cases may suggest. Regulators mandate disclosure both to provide infor-
mation, in the hope that consumers will modify their purchasing behavior 
to align with the public interest, and to persuade them to view the public 
interest as their own. The government's means of achieving behavior 
modification is what is importantly different between the speech restraint 
and speech disclosure cases. The "paternalism" of regulating to modify 
consumer behavior to achieve a public interest remains the same. 
3. Can the Information Be Selected and Presented to Persuade? 
The Court in Zauderer distinguished unconstitutional compulsions 
that individuals publicize or recite ideological government messages 
from the requirement that the attorney include "purely factual and uncon-
troversial information" with his own commercial speech.201 Several 
courts have evaluated disclosure requirements against this standard, 
reaching different conclusions as to whether the disclosure requirement 
was unconstitutionally persuasive. 
The Seventh Circuit accepted this argument in striking down an Il-
linois statute that required distributors to place a four square inch "18" 
label on "sexually explicit" video games, and to post signs and distribute 
brochures explaining the rating system. 202 The state's purpose for the 
regulation was "shielding children from indecent sexual material and in 
assisting parents in protecting their children from that material." 203 The 
court rejected the state's contention that the contents of the label and 
signage were similar to the required disclosure of mercury content in 
lights, which was upheld by the Second Circuit in Sorrell: 
With regard to the "18" sticker requirement , this argument seems to 
be plainly unsound. The [state statute] requires that the "18" sticker 
be placed on games that meet the statute's definition of "sexually ex-
plicit." The State's definition of this term is far more opinion-based 
than the question of whether a particular chemical is within any given 
product. Even if one assumes that the State's definition of "sexually 
explicit" is precise, it is the State's definition-the video game manu-
facturer or retailer may have an entirely different definition of this 
term. Yet the requirement that the "18" sticker be attached to all 
games meeting the State's definition forces the game-seller to include 
this non-factual information in its message that is the game's packag-
ing. The sticker ultimately communicates a subjective and highly 
controversial message-that the game's content is sexually explicit. 
201. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 
651 (1985). 
202. Entm't Software Ass'n v. Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641, 643 (7th Cir. 2006). 
203. Id. at 646. 
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This is unlike a surgeon general's warning of the carcinogenic prop-
erties of cigarettes, the analogy the State attempts to draw.204 
Because it found the speech to be ideological, the court applied 
strict scrutiny to invalidate it as not narrowly tailored. It reached the 
same conclusions with respect to the signs and brochures explaining the 
rating system, finding in addition that these items unconstitutionally re-
quired sellers to "communicate endorsement of the [Entertainment Soft-
ware Rating Board], a non-governmental third party whose message may 
be in conflict with that of any particular retailer." 205 The court did not 
cite or distinguish the Supreme Court's decision in Meese, which upheld 
a "propaganda" label on political speech.206 
Outside the context of video game labels,207 courts have found se-
lective disclosure requirements to meet 'Zauderer's "factual and uncon-
troversial" requirement. For example, the Ninth Circuit reviewed a chal-
lenge by municipal units to an EPA rule that required, as a condition to 
receiving a permit to discharge waste into waterways, that they "distrib-
ute educational materials to the community" about the dangers of storm 
water runoff.208 The court found that "[i]nforrning the public about safe 
toxin disposal is non-ideological." 209 The Second Circuit in NYSRA spe-
cifically addressed the restaurant association's claim that calorie disclo-
sure was unconstitutionally selective: 
NYSRA does not contend that disclosure of calorie information is not 
"factual"; it only claims that its member restaurants do not want to 
communicate to their customers that calorie amounts should be pri-
oritized among other nutrient amounts, such as those listed in [the] 
Nutrition Fact panel. However, the First Amendment does not bar the 
204. Id. at 652. 
205. Id. at 653. 
206. Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 480-85 (1987); see supra notes 62-64 and accompanying 
text. The Ninth Circuit invalidated a similar "18" labeling requirement for violent videos, finding it 
inconsistent with "the factual information and deception prevention standards set forth in Zauderer ' 
after it held that the state could not constitutionally prohibit under 18 year olds from purchasing the 
videos. Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 966-67 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(citing Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651 
(1985)) ("Unless the Act can clearly and legally characterize a video game as 'violent' and not 
subject to First Amendment protections , the ' 18' sticker does not convey factual information .") 
(emphasis added). 
207. That the product labeled is, itself, speech , muddies the analysis. See, e.g., Am. Amuse-
ment Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 576-77 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that video games are 
speech). Additionally, ratings systems present an intermediary step between the product information 
and the information on the label, which makes the government's selective judgment about the infor-
mation provided more apparent. 
208. Envtl. Def. Ctr., Inc. v. EPA, 344 F.3d 832, 848 (9th Cir. 2003). 
209. Id. at 849- 50 (analyzing EPA's administrative rules implementing the Clean Water Act 
that require small municipal sewer systems that discharge waste to conduct public education efforts 
about the effects of sewer discharges .); see also Nat'! Elec. Mfrs. Ass' n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 114 
n.5 (2d Cir. 200 I) ("Our decision reaches only required disclosure of factual commercial informa-
tion [about mercury content].") ; Conn. Bar Ass' n v. U.S., 394 B.R. 274, 286 n.13 (D. Conn. 2008) 
(" ln contrast [to the cases involving compelled dissemination of ideological speech], the required 
disclosures here are all facts about the bankruptcy process."). 
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City from compelling such "under-inclusive" factual disclosures, 
where ... the City's decision to focus its attention on calorie amounts 
is rational. 210 
885 
Although they involve selective disclosures arguably crafted, at 
least in part, to persuade, all of the disclosure requirements addressed by 
the courts thus far have involved information that consumers likely 
would not know without the disclosure. In challenging the new cigarette 
labels, sellers argue that the graphic, colorful labels are more constitu-
tionally offensive because they present information that consumers al-
ready know or could be brought to know in a far less eye-catching way, 
and so are obviously crafted not to inform but to persuade.211 The district 
court disagreed, finding that "the government's goal is not to stigmatize 
the use of tobacco products on the industry's dime; it is to ensure that the 
health risk message is actually seen by consumers in the first in-
stance."212 The court rejected the cigarette manufacturers' proposed 
analogy to video game labeling, describing the message required to be 
disclosed on the packages as "objective" and as having "not been contro-
versial for many decades." 213 As to the required addition of graphic im-
agery, the court said that it did "not believe that [it] will alter the sub-
stance of such messages, at least as a general rule." 214 Interestingly, in an 
earlier part of the decision, the court accepted the cigarette manufactur-
ers' challenge to a portion of the statute that banned the use of color or 
graphics in their labeling or advertising, finding that symbols and "some 
uses of color" communicate information in a different, and potentially 
more persuasive, way than the black and white text the statute re-
. 215 quires. 
II. THE ABORTION DISCLOSURE CASES 
At the same time that it has been reviewing restrictions of commer-
cial speech more rigorously, the Court has been developing a jurispru-
dence of constitutionally permissible disclosure requirements in the con-
text of abortion. By contrast to the tightening of review of government 
regulations and the mixed signals that fuel challenges to commercial 
speech disclosure requirements, the abortion disclosure jurisprudence is 
relatively unambiguous. In this line of cases, firm answers exist - either 
in the Court's terse comments or in the lower courts' more lengthy appli-
210. N.Y. State Rest. Ass'n v. N.Y. City Bd. of Health (NYSRA), 556 F.3d 114, 134 (2d Cir. 
2009) (citation omitted). 
21 I. Commonwealth Brands v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 2d 512, 530 (W.D. Ky. 2010). 
212. Id. 
213. Id. at 531. 
214. Id. at 532. 
215. Id. at 525. The district court invalidated the "ban on color and graphics in labels and 
advertising" for tobacco products under the third and fourth prongs of Central Hudson, which re-
quire a "direct" and "no more extensive than is necessary" relationship between the end and means . 
Id. at 521, 541. 
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cations - to what seems like open questions in the commercial speech 
line of cases. 
A. The Supreme Court's Informed Consent to Abortion Cases 
The abortion disclosure cases began immediately after Roe v. 
Wade216 established a constitutional right to choose abortion before fetal 
viability.217 In the early cases after the Roe v. Wade decision, the Court 
addressed the impact of informed consent provisions on a woman's pri-
vacy right, without discussing the impact of the requirements on abortion 
providers' free speech rights. 218 Under Roe's trimester framework, a state 
could not impose a regulation that had a "significant impact on the wom-
an's exercise of her [abortion] right" 219 during the first three months of 
pregnancy, and could not impose such a regulation for the purpose of 
protecting fetal life until the third trimester. 220 Employing this analysis, 
the Court reasoned that protecting the woman's health was the only pur-
pose that could support a mandatory information disclosure requirement, 
and it scrutinized the pieces of information that states selected for disclo-
sure,221 invalidating disclosure requirements that it deemed "not relevant 
to [informed] consent" 222 and "designed to influence the woman's in-
formed choice between abortion or childbirth." 223 
In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,224 a 
majority of the Court modified its prior decision in Roe to acknowledge 
the existence of a legitimate government interest in protecting fetal life 
that attaches at the beginning of the pregnancy, and applied this revision 
to uphold disclosure requirements indistinguishable from those it had 
invalidated in prior cases.225 The plurality and concurring justices on this 
issue wrote separately. 226 Only the plurality addressed the abortion pro-
216. 4IOU.S . 113(1973). 
217. Id. at 164---65. 
218. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Kan. City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 
490-91 (] 983) (upholding a state consent statute which comported with Belotti II); Bellotti v. Baird 
(Bellotti fl) , 443 U.S. 622, 643 (1979) (concluding a state could require parental consent but only if 
the state also provides "an alternative procedure whereby authorization for the abortion can be 
obtained"); Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti!), 428 U.S. 132, 145 (1976) (explaining that a state consent 
statute may not create a "parental veto"); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 
69-70 (1976) (striking down a state statute requiring a husband's written consent). 
219. City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health , Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 430 (1983). 
220. See Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 446 (1977). 
221. City of Akron, 462 U.S. at 443 (clarifying that a state does not have "unreviewable author-
ity to decide what information a woman must be given before she chooses to have an abortion"). 
222. Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists , 476 U.S. 747, 763 (1986) 
("Under the guise of informed consent , the Act requires the dissemination of information that is not 
relevant to such consent , and, thus, it advances no legitimate state interest."). 
223. City of Akron , 462 U.S. at 444. 
224. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
225. Id. at 878. 
226. Justices O'Co nnor, Kennedy and Souter announced the judgment of the Court and deliv-
ered a plurality opinion. Id. at 841. Justices Rehnquist, White, Scalia and Thomas concurred in the 
judgment that the disclosure requirement did not violate the due process clause, but would have 
applied rational basis analysis to reach this result. Id. at 967- 69. 
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viders' Free Speech Clause claim. 227 While preserving the "essence of 
the abortion right," the plurality rejected Roe's trimester framework rea-
soning and replaced it with an "undue burden" inquiry that applies to 
state regulations imposed from the onset of the pregnancy. 228 In deter-
mining that the disclosure requirements at issue did not impose an undue 
burden on the abortion right, the plurality explicitly rejected prior Court 
holdings that only a purpose to protect women's health could support 
required disclosure. It held that states may select information and man-
date disclosure for the purpose of protecting fetal life and "to persuade 
her to choose childbirth over abortion." 229 In discussing the required dis-
closures that may survive this undue burden analysis, the plurality twice 
stated that the disclosures should be "truthful and not misleading." 230 
After finding that the disclosure requirements imposed no unconsti-
tutional burden on the prospective abortion consumer, the Casey plurality 
briefly addressed the abortion providers' claim that the mandated disclo-
sures violated their Free Speech Clause rights. 231 The plurality first rea-
soned that the providers' claim acquired no heightened value because of 
its articulation in the context of the protected abortion right.232 With this 
put aside, "[a]ll that is left of petitioners' argument is an asserted First 
Amendment right of a physician not to provide information about the 
risks of abortion, and childbirth, in a manner mandated by the State." 233 
The plurality reasoned: 
To be sure, the physician's First Amendment rights not to speak are 
implicated, but only as part of the practice of medicine, subject to 
reasonable licensing and regulation by the State. We see no constitu-
tional infirmity in the requirement that the physician provide the in-
formation mandated by the State here.234 
227. Id. at 884 (concluding that an abortion provider ' s constitutional right "not to provide 
information" extends "only as part of the practice of medicine, subject to reasonable licensing and 
regulation by the State"). 
228. Id. at 876 ("[T]he undue burden standard is the appropriate means of reconciling the 
State's interest with the woman's constitutionally protected liberty."). 
229. Id. at 878, 882- 83 (asserting that governments may require that women considering 
abortion receive information about "the availability of materials relating to the consequences to the 
fetus, even when those consequences have no direct relation to her health," and even when the 
information provided "expresses a preference for childbirth over abortion "). 
230. Id. at 882 (prior cases went too far in invalidating disclosure of "truthful , nonmisleading 
information"). 
23 I. Id. at 884. 
232. Id. ("Whatever constitutional status the doctor-patient relation may have as a general 
matter , in the present context it is derivative of the woman's position . The doctor-patient relation 
does not underlie or override the two more general rights under which the abortion right is justified : 
the right to make family decisions and the right to physical autonomy. On its own, the doctor-patient 
relation here is entitled to the same solicitude it receives in other contexts. Thus , a requirement that a 
doctor give a woman certain information as part of obtaining her consent to an abortion is, for con-
stitutional purposes , no different from a requirement that a doctor give certain specific information 
about any medical procedure ."). 
233. Id. 
234. Id. (citations omitted) . 
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Although not specifically reviewing a disclosure requirement, the 
Court later, in Gonzales v. Carhart,235 characterized its holding in Casey 
to be that "[t]he government may use its voice and its regulatory author-
ity to show its profound respect for the life within the woman."236 In ad-
dressing the question whether barring a type of procedure imposed an 
undue burden on the right to choose abortion, in light of claims that it 
was necessary in some circumstances to protect the health of abortion 
consumers, it said, "The Court has given state and federal legislatures 
wide discretion to pass legislation in areas where there is medical and 
scientific uncertainty. "237 
B. Informed Consent in the Lower Courts-Issues and Answers 
States have enacted a number of abortion disclosure requirements 
since the Court's decision in Casey, and as the Court's commercial 
speech and government speech jurisprudences have continued develop-
ing. Many of these "informed consent" provisions both go beyond in-
formation normally required by the informed consent doctrine and can 
reasonably be interpreted as designed to persuade women not to choose 
abortion.238 Lower courts have addressed the increasing Free Speech 
Clause challenges brought by abortion providers to the disclosure re-
quirements, fleshing out Casey's few sentences to identify the standard 
of review and analysis that apply to such claims. 
1. The Test is Rational Basis 
Lower courts have uniformly interpreted Casey to apply a "reason-
able relationship" test to claims by abortion providers that disclosure 
requirements violate their free speech rights. 239 Several courts have noted 
that the level of review would change if states were to require doctors to 
provide patients with state mandated "ideology" instead of factual dis-
closures. 240 Many courts have noted and grafted onto the Free Speech 
235. 550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
236. Id. at 157. 
237. Id. at 163. 
238. Rebecca Dresser, From Double Standard to Double Bind: Informed Choice in Abortion 
Law , 76 GEO. WASH . L. REV. 1599, 1609 (2008). According to a recent Guttmacher Institute report 
17 states mandate that women be given "counseling" before an abortion that includes information on 
at least one of the following: the purported link between abortion and breast cancer (6 states), the 
ability of a fetus to feel pain (9 states), long-term mental health consequences for the woman (7 
states) or information on the availability of ultrasound (8 states). Commentators argue that at least 
some of these provisions should be interpreted to violate the Free Speech Clause. Id. at 1609- 12; see 
Caroline Mala Corbin, The First Amendment Right Against Compelled Listening , 89 B.U. L. REV. 
939, 1007--09 (2009) (provisions violate the rights of the listener); Robert Post, Informed Consent to 
Abortion: A First Amendment Analysis of Compelled Physician Speech , 2007 U. ILL L. REV. 939, 
959 (2007) (provisions violate the right of the speaker). 
239. This tracks the Court 's language and brief analysis . See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (doctors ' speech subject to "reasonable .. . regulation by the State"). 
240. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 734-35 (8th 
Cir. 2008) ("Casey and Gonzales establish that the State cannot compel an individual simply to 
speak the State's ideological message . .. . "). 
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Clause test the additional requirement twice articulated by the Casey 
plurality in its undue burden analysis that "permissible" disclosure re-
quirements must be "truthful and not misleading." 241 
This phraseology parallels language contained in several different 
parts of its commercial speech jurisprudence. Central Hudson's first 
prong requires that commercial speech be "lawful activity and not be 
misleading" to earn entry into the protected category. 242 And, as noted 
above, lower courts have interpreted 'Zauderer to require that the content 
of mandated disclosure requirements be "factual and uncontroversial." 243 
The Supreme Court plurality did not make any of these connections, and 
neither have the lower courts. No court has considered applying the full 
tests set out in Central Hudson or 'Zauderer to state requirements that 
doctors deliver state mandated information along with their own speech. 
2. The Purpose Can Be "Paternalistic" 
As to legitimate purposes that can support mandated disclosure re-
quirements , courts have applied as binding precedent the Casey plural-
ity's reasoning that either a purpose to protect maternal health or to pro-
tect the life of the unborn fetus will suffice. 244 Protecting maternal health 
is a purpose consistent with furthering the consumer's rational self inter-
est in self protection. Protecting the life of an unborn fetus is a purpose 
that asks the abortion consumer to think beyond herself, to consider how 
other beings, and one "being" in particular, will be affected by her deci-
sion to undergo the procedure. That is, despite some efforts by the Court 
to cast it as a purpose that serves the woman's self interest,245 protecting 
the life of the unborn fetus is a public purpose that may well conflict with 
the consumer's rational self interest. 
As explained above, the "paternalistic approach" that the Court 
condemns in the context of commercial speech restraints involves the 
combination of (1) restricting speech, (2) to reduce demand, (3) to serve 
a public interest, which is something other than ensuring fully informed 
and accurate consumer decision-making. 246 In holding that states may 
constitutionally mandate disclosure, in a way "which might cause the 
241. Id. at 746. 
242. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 
(1980). 
243. See supra Part I.C.3. 
244. See, e.g., Karlin v. Foust, 188 F.3d 446, 495 (7th Cir. 1999) ("[T]he district court con-
cluded that the provisions challenged ... bore a reasonable relationship to the state's goal of promot-
ing childbirth over abortion .... [T]he district court went on to pronounce that 'were Casey not 
binding, I might be inclined to hold that [the statute containing the disclosure requirements] was 
passed with an impermissible purpose .... However , lower courts are bound by Supreme Court 
precedent. I do not see how Casey does not control this question ."') (third omission in original). 
245. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992) (stating that informa-
tion about the fetus is relevant to a woman's "psychological well-being," which "is a facet of 
health"). 
246. See supra Part I.C.2. 
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woman to choose childbirth over abortion," and which was enacted for 
the purpose of "express[ing] a preference for childbirth over abortion," 247 
the Court has held that steps two and three are constitutional when com-
bined with the means of required disclosure in the context of consumer 
decision making with respect to the service of abortion. 248 Lower courts 
uniformly understand and apply this principle . 
3. The Information Can Be Selected and Presented to Persuade 
The Casey plurality was not ambiguous. 249 The lower courts have 
interpreted its words to say that states may pursue their legitimate pur-
pose of protecting fetal life by requiring disclosure of information se-
lected to persuade potential abortion consumers to decide against the 
procedure. 250 They have also addressed claims by abortion providers that 
particular state disclosure requirements go beyond the bounds of permis-
sible state persuasion authorized in Casey, either because they impart 
ideology instead of information, or because the information required to 
be disclosed is untruthful or misleading. 251 
Lower courts have had to address the two prongs of the Casey plu-
rality's reasoning and to reconcile them with the particular statutory pro-
visions under review. These are, first, that the First Amendment would 
prohibit a state from mandating that a private individual "simply ... 
speak the State's ideological message" 252 and second, that the informa-
tional disclosures required by the Pennsylvania statute at issue in Casey, 
even though, at least in part, "designed to persuade [women] to choose 
childbirth over abortion," 253 did not do that. Although these courts have 
reached different conclusions with respect to the application of Casey's 
reasoning to particular types of provisions, they have generally inter-
preted the precedent to allow government regulators a wide range of dis-
cretion both to choose information that abortion providers must present 
to potential consumers, and to direct the means of presentation in order 
to further the public purpose of reducing demand for a lawful service. 
247. Casey, 505 U.S. at 883. 
248. Id. 
249. See id. at 878 (noting that a state measure may be "designed to persuade [a woman] to 
choose childbirth over abortion"). 
250. Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 735 (8th Cir. 2008) ("[A 
State may] use its regulatory authority to require a physician to provide truthful , non-misleading 
information relevant to a patient's decision to have an abortion, even if that information might also 
encourage the patient to choose childbirth over abortion."); see also Karlin v. Foust, 188 F.3d 446, 
495 (7th Cir. 1999) (reviewing and approving, in the context of undue burden analysis , the district 
court's conclusion that Casey directs that "legislation is based on a permissible purpose if it is rea-
sonably related to promoting childbirth over abortion or protecting maternal health") . 
251. See Rounds, 530 F.3d at 735-3 6. 
252. Id. at 735. 
253. Casey, 505 U.S. at 878. 
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In Eubanks v. Schmidt, 254 the district court noted that the "possible 
ideological component" of the informed consent requirement presented 
an "interesting and important enough issue." 255 After reasoning that, ac-
cording to its brief discussion, the Casey plurality must have "believed 
these [challenged disclosures] to convey information reasonably related 
to informed consent, not ideology," the court further observed that "it is 
easy to see why some would disagree ."256 The court noted that "a statute 
requiring every physician to advise women of their right to have an abor-
tion ... might be equally justified as the one here," but concluded that 
"[s]imply because a subject is controversial ... does not make it ideo-
logical."257 Although "the legislature passed [the statute at issue] to fur-
ther its preference for birth over abortion," the mandated disclosures "do 
not overtly trumpet that preference ."258 Consequently, the court, like the 
Supreme Court, viewed them as "merely providing information." 259 
The Eubanks court further rejected the abortion providers' claim 
that the state statute was invalid because it required providers to pay for 
the state-created literature they were also required to distribute.260 Two 
other district courts reached the opposite result, reasoning differently as 
to both whether a state ideological message was obvious in the disclosure 
requirement, and whether abortion providers could constitutionally be 
required to pay. In Karlin v. Foust, 261 the court found that the state statu-
tory requirement that abortion providers distribute "state-printed and 
county-compiled materials" was "far more than a simple vehicle for in-
formation distribution." 262 In its view, the disclosure requirement 
"force[d] physicians to associate themselves with the state's anti-abortion 
message, a message that is implicit in the information provided even if it 
is never stated explicitly." 263 Although the court acknowledged that Ca-
sey was binding as to the constitutionality of the distribution require-
ment, it invalidated the additional requirement that the abortion providers 
pay for the information. 264 
The district court in Summit Medical Center of Alabama, Inc. v. Ri-
le/65 addressed these questions more recently. In its view: 
254. 126 F. Supp. 2d 451 (W.D. Ky. 2000). 
255. Id. at 458 n.11. 
256. Id. 
257. Id. 
258. Id. 
259. Id. 
260. Id. at 460 ("(J]t is not clear that requiring the physicians to pay for the pamphlets changes 
the constitutional analysis to any extent."). 
261. 975 F. Supp. 1177 (W.D. Wis. 1997). 
262. Id. at 1225. 
263. Id. 
264. Id. at 1226. The appellate court did not review the Free Speech Clause part of the holding. 
Karlin v. Foust, 188 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 1999). 
265. 274 F. Supp. 2d 1262 (M.D. Ala. 2003). 
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The Supreme Court's First Amendment decision in Casey expressly 
rejected the notion that a state may require distribution only of ideo-
logically neutral information regarding abortion-that is, information 
that not only is truthful and not misleading, but also that does not ex-
press a preference in favor of either childbirth or abortion, because 
Pennsylvania's challenged informational materials did express a pre-
ference for childbirth over abortion. 266 
After reviewing Supreme Court precedent with respect to compelled 
contributions to ideological and commercial speech,267 the court con-
cluded, like the court in Karlin, that "providers of abortion services con-
stitutionally may be required to distribute the state-prepared materials, 
and offer for viewing the state-prepared videotape, advancing policy 
positions with which they disagree, i.e., the preference of alternatives to 
abortion, but they may not be compelled to finance the production of the 
materials and videotape. "268 
In the Eighth Circuit, four judicial decisions thus far address South 
Dakota's requirement that doctors provide those considering abortion a 
writing stating, among other things, "[t]hat the abortion will terminate 
the life of a whole, separate, unique, living human being." 269 The district 
court, which was the first court to review the challenge, granted a pre-
liminary injunction against enforcement of the disclosure requirement, 
finding that the abortion providers had established a fair chance of suc-
cess on their claim that the provision unconstitutionally required them to 
"espouse the State's ideology." 270 In a divided decision, a circuit court 
panel affirmed.271 The Eighth Circuit reversed the panel in an 8-4 en 
bane decision.272 Judge Gruender, a dissenter in the original panel, wrote 
the court's opinion, reasoning that, although "[t]aken in isolation," the 
"human being" disclosure requirement "certainly may be read to make a 
point in the debate about the ethics of abortion," it must properly be read 
to include its narrowing statutory definition. 273 The two judges from the 
266. Id. at 1270; see also id. at 1273 n.10 ("Casey distinguished Wooley by saying that the 
distribution of an ideological message under the statute at issue in Casey was required only as a part 
of the practice of medicine .... "). 
267. The Court had not yet decided Johann s, which held that individuals have no First 
Amendment right to avoid targeted taxes that fund government speech with which they disagree. 
Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 562 (2005). 
268. Summit Med. Ctr., 274 F. Supp. 2d at 1277. 
269. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS§ 34-23A-10.l(l)(b) (2009). 
270. Planned Parenthood Minn. , N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 375 F. Supp. 2d 881, 887 (D. S.D. 
2005) ("Unlike the truthful, non-misleading medical and legal information doctors were required to 
disclose in Casey, the South Dakota statute requires abortion doctors to enunciate the State's view-
point on an unsettled medical, philosophical , theological , and scientific issue, that is, whether a fetus 
is a human being."). 
271. Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds , 467 F.3d 716, 725 (2006) (statute 's 
disclosure provision "forc[es] an abortion provider to recite the state's ideological objections to 
abortion"). 
272. Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724 (8th Cir. 2008) . 
273. Rounds, 530 F.3d at 735. This "define[s] 'Human being' for the purposes of the informed-
consent-to-abortion statute as 'an individual living member of the species of Homo sapiens , includ-
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panel majority dissented, joined by two other judges, reasoning more 
emphatically than they had in their panel opinion that the "human being" 
statement "crosses the constitutional line [between permissible factual 
disclosures and impermjssible ideology] by requiring physicians to 
communicate metaphysical ideas unrelated to any legitimate state interest 
in regulating the practice of medicine ."274 
The district court on remand granted the state's motion for summary 
judgment with respect to the "human being" provision, finding no Free 
Speech Clause violation because the statute permitted abortion providers 
to explain to patients that the term is biological and not ideological. 275 It 
then addressed whether two other challenged disclosure requirements 
were "truthful and not misleading ," as the court read Casey to require. 276 
Relying upon the state's concession that the required disclosure "[t]hat 
the pregnant woman has an existing relationship with th[e] unborn hu-
man being" referred to a legal, rather than a biological, relationship be-
tween the woman and fetus, the court found it to be untruthful, mislead-
ing and thus unconstitutional because such a legal relationship between 
born and unborn does not exist as a matter of federal constitutional or 
state law.277 The court also evaluated the statutory requirement that abor-
tion provider s disclose "all known medical risks of the procedure . . . 
including . .. [an] [i]ncreased risk of suicide ideation and suicide." 278 
Based on a finding that "[d]efendants have produced no evidence ... to 
show that it is generally recognized that having an abortion causes an 
increased risk of suicide ideation and suicide," the court concluded that 
"[b]ecause such a risk is not 'known,' the suicide disclosure language of 
the statute is untruthful and misleading." 279 
Other courts have applied the "truthful and not misleading" re-
quirement to abortion disclosure requirements. In Eubanks, as part of its 
Free Speech Clause inquiry, the court determined that photographs of 
fetal development included in state produced material met this standard , 
even though some were over-colored and oversized: 
True, some of the fetal development photographs are color enhanced 
and other photos are enlarged . Even so, the photographs are neither 
misleading nor untruthful. Regardless of their size, photographs do 
not become misleading so long as the statutorily required scale al-
lows an average person to determine their actual size. Nor does the 
ing the unborn human being during the entire embryonic and fetal ages from fertilization to full 
gestation .'" Id. at 727 (quotin g S.D. CODIFLED LAWS§ 34-23A-l ). 
274 . Rounds , 530 F.3d at 743 (Murphy , J., dissenting). 
275 . Planned Parenthood Minn. , N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 650 F. Supp. 2d 972, 976- 77 (D . S.D. 
2009). 
276 . Id. at 977- 78. The court seemed to be applying the Free Speech Clause , although some 
language suggests that it was considering due process undue burden analysis as well. 
277. Id. (first alteration in original). 
278 . S.D. CODIFIED LAW§ 34-23A-10 .l ( l )(e)(ii) (2009) . 
279. Rounds, 650 F. Supp. 2d at 983 . 
894 DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87:4 
color enhancement make an otherwise accurate depiction misleading. 
The pictures provide an accurate rendition of the fetus at various 
stages of development, as required by the Statute.280 
In Karlin v. Foust, 281 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that 
a statutory requirement that providers inform women seeking abortions 
that medical technology was available "to enable a pregnant woman to 
view the image or hear the heartbeat of her unborn child" was not false 
and misleading, even though it could not actually detect a fetal heartbeat 
in the early stages of pregnancy. 282 In Summit Medical Center of Ala-
bama, Inc. v. Siegelman, 283 the district court required the addition of cer-
tain other information to render the state-imposed requirement that pro-
viders inform a woman "that a nonviable unborn child at more than 19 
weeks gestation 'may be able to survive' outside the womb" consistent 
with Casey's requirement that the disclosures be "truthful and not mis-
leading. "284 
In sum, in the context of informed consent to abortion, lower courts 
have applied the Casey precedent to uphold a wide range of information 
disclosure requirements against Free Speech Clause challenges by ser-
vice providers. More explicitly than in the so-called commercial speech 
cases, a number of courts and judges have noticed that governments have 
selected the particular pieces of information for required disclosure, and, 
in some instances, crafted the means of presentation and disclosure for 
the purpose of modifying consumer decision making rather than merely 
informing it. In this line of cases, the courts uniformly interpret Supreme 
Court precedent to require that the court apply deferential review to dis-
closure requirements imposed on abortion service providers' speech 
without respect to whether preventing consumer deception is the gov-
ernment's aim. 
Ill THE DEFERENTIAL ABORTION "INFORMED CONSENT" ANALYSIS 
CONTROLS COMMERCIAL SPEECH DISCLOSURE CASES 
Although the Court has never noted the similarity, the commercial 
speech and abortion disclosure cases in fact address the same Free 
Speech Clause right.285 Whatever signals various combinations of jus-
280. Eubanks v. Schmidt, 126 F. Supp. 2d 451, 459 (W.D. Ky. 2000). 
281. 188 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 1999). 
282. Id. at 491- 92 (reasoning that "the information required to be conveyed under the fetal 
heartbeat provision is neither false nor misleading because the services are available to all women; it 
is simply a question of when such services would render useful results"). 
283. 227 F.Supp. 2d 1194 (M.D. Ala. 2002). 
284. Id. at 1203 (stating that providers "must go beyond a simple mechanical reading of this 
provision and provide the woman with the following information: 1) a full and complete definition 
of the term 'survive ' in accordance with the physician's good faith clinical judgment ; 2) the nature 
of any survival ; 3) survival is merely a possibility; and 4) survival will or may be of extremely 
limited duration"). 
285. The right to choose abortion is a constitutionally protected right on the consumer side, and 
so the undue burden analysis could perhaps limit what an abortion provider can be compelled to say 
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tices may be sending about the continuing vitality of Zauderer and defer-
ential review of commercial speech disclosure requirements, the Court 
cannot consistently apply a higher level of scrutiny to disclosure re-
quirements imposed on products and other types of services so long as 
the current abortion "informed consent" jurisprudence exists. 
Regulatory authority to require disclosures in the contexts of abor-
tion and other services and product sales stems from the same source. 286 
Justice White, joined by Justice Rehnquist, made precisely this point 
when dissenting from one of the Court's early decisions applying Roe to 
invalidate persuasive disclosure requirements because of the burden they 
placed on the abortion right. 287 According to the dissent: 
The rationale for state efforts to regulate the practice of a profession 
or vocation is simple: the government is entitled not to trust members 
of a profession to police themselves, and accordingly the legislature 
may for the most part impose such restrictions on the practice of a 
profession or business as it may find necessary to the protection of 
the public. This is precisely the rationale for infringing the profes-
sional freedom of doctors by imposing disclosure requirements upon 
them: "Respect for the patient's right of self-determination on par-
ticular therapy demands a standard set by law for physicians rather 
than one which physicians may or may not impose upon them-
selves. "288 
The Court has repeatedly recognized that lawyer speech to potential 
clients, through advertising, is commercial speech. 289 Both of the Court's 
primary speech disclosure cases involved lawyer speech. 290 Lawyers are 
professionals and doctors are professionals. Both provide information 
about their services that may influence a potential client to buy it. Both 
types of speech, like commercial speech more generally, have constitu-
tional value primarily because of the information they provide to poten-
tial consumers. Again, Justice White in his early dissent, convincingly 
linked government regulation of the two types of professional speech, 
if the requirement that the woman receive the information poses a significant obstacle to the right to 
choose the procedure . See Corbin, supra note 238. 
286. States have a general police power to protect consumer and other public interests. Con-
gress's authority to regulate interstate commerce allows it to impose disclosure requirements on 
sales and services, and includes regulating the abortion procedure. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 
124, 166 (2007). 
287. Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 785 (1986). 
288. Id. at 803 (quoting Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 784 (D.C. Cir. 1972)). 
289. See Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 623 (1995); Ibanez v. Fla. Dep't of Bus. 
and Prof! Regulation , Bd. of Accountancy, 512 U.S. 136, 142 (1994); Peel v. Attorney Registration 
& Disciplinary Comm'n of Ill., 496 U.S. 91, 99- 101, 110-11 (1990); Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass'n , 486 
U.S. 466, 468 (1988); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 
U.S. 626, 637-38 (1985); In re R. M. J., 455 U.S. 191, 206-07 (1982); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar 
Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 454 (1978); Bates v. State Bar of Az ., 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977). 
290. Milavetz , Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1339 (2010) ("The 
parties agree, as do we, that the challenged provisions regulate only commercial speech."); Zoud-
erer, 471 U.S. at 629. 
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citing 'Zauderer for the conclusion that the same standard of judicial re-
view should apply to disclosure requirements imposed to regulate all 
types of commercial speech: 
Were the Court serious about the need for strict scrutiny of regula-
tions that infringe on the 'judgment" of medical professionals, 
"structure" their relations with their patients, and amount to "state 
medicine," there is no telling how many state and federal statutes (not 
to mention principles of state tort law) governing the practice of med-
icine might be condemned. And of course, there would be no reason 
why a concern for professional freedom could be confined to the 
medical profession: nothing in the Constitution indicates a preference 
for the liberty of doctors over that of lawyers, accountants, bankers, 
or brickmakers . Accordingly, if the State may not "structure" the dia-
logue between doctor and patient, it should also follow that the State 
may not, for example, require attorneys to disclose to their clients in-
formation concerning the risks of representing the client in a particu-
lar proceeding. Of course, we upheld such disclosure requirements 
291 
only last Term. 
In Casey, a Court majority adopted Justice White's proposed inter-
pretation of the appropriate scope of government authority to require 
doctors to disclose information in connection with the abortion proce-
dure. 292 Although none of the justices linked the Free Speech Clause 
analysis to its lawyer advertising or commercial speech disclosure cases, 
the Third Circuit had explicitly characterized the informed consent pro-
vision at issue as a disclosure requirement imposed on commercial 
speech.293 More recently, a few other courts and commentators have 
noted that the constitutional questions presented by mandated disclosures 
of information are similar, whether it is a professional service or a prod-
uct for sale.294 No court or commentator appears to have addressed the 
two lines of cases and reasoned that the Constitution requires more def-
erential judicial review of abortion disclosures than of disclosure re-
quirements imposed on other types of commercial speech. 295 Because 
291. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 802--03 (citing :lauderer, 471 U.S. 626). 
292. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
293. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 705 (3d Cir. 1991), rev'd, 505 U.S. 
833 (1992). 
294. Conn. Bar Ass'n v. United States, 394 B.R. 274, 286 n.13 (D. Conn. 2008) ("Although 
:lauderer was decided in the commercial speech context, and Casey in the abortion context, a rea-
sonable relation test was applied in both situations to analyze the constitutionality of factual disclo-
sures by professionals ."); Hersh v. United States, 553 F.3d 743, 766 (5th Cir. 2008) ; Olsen v. Gonza-
les, 350 B.R. 906, 918 (D. Or. 2006) (quoting Hersh v. United States, 347 B.R. 19 (N.D. Tex. 
2006)); see also Tushnet , supra note 178, 237 ("We don ' t generally think of doctor-patient interac-
tions as instances of commercial speech, but the problems of regulating what can be said about a 
service provided for money are very similar.") ; Post, supra note 238, 974-79 (noting the similarity 
of the two lines of cases in the context of his argument that certain "informed consent" requirements 
should be held to unconstitutionally intrude onto professional speech). 
295. If there were to be any difference between the scrutiny applied to disclosure requirement s 
imposed on pre-abortion speech as opposed to speech preceding other commercial transactions , the 
scrutiny with respect to the doctor-patient interchange should be higher. Abortion is a constitution-
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both lines of cases involve the same type of government action taken 
with respect to the same category of speech, the analysis that the Court 
applies to commercial speech and abortion disclosure requirements must 
be the same. 
CONCLUSION 
In the context of abortion disclosure, the Supreme Court has held 
that governments may, through the means of requiring disclosure of in-
formation, pursue purposes other than preventing consumer deception or 
even ensuring that the potential abortion consumer receives a free and 
unbiased flow of information. The Supreme Court has held that govern-
ments may select information and require its disclosure for the purpose 
of persuading potential consumers to eschew the procedure. That is, gov-
ernments may provide information to influence consumer reactions for 
the purpose of reducing demand for a lawful product. Additionally, lower 
courts have held that governments may present information likely al-
ready known to the consumer in vivid, eye-catching ways that make the 
purpose to persuade even more apparent. 
All of these holdings provide firm answers to the cigarette manufac-
turers' allegation that graphic labels unconstitutionally compel them to 
deliver government speech, as it does to similar challenges that may be 
mounted by other types of commercial speakers. The Constitution allows 
the government to select and compel the delivery of information in con-
nection with commercial transactions for the purpose of modifying con-
sumer behavior, and, more specifically, for the purpose of persuading 
consumers to avoid the purchase entirely. Unless and until the informed 
consent to abortion jurisprudence changes, product vendors who argue 
that only a government purpose to prevent deception can justify a disclo-
sure requirement imposed on their commercial speech have no case. 
ally protected right , which could mean it would add weight to the listener's interest in avoiding 
government speech choices . See Casey, 505 U.S. at 884. And, doctors are professionals, which may 
add weight to their interest in avoiding impositions on their patient counseling speech. See Post, 
supra note 238, 974- 78. 
